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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE -

STANDING -

A

CONSERVATION GROUP WHICH CHALLENGES AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY ACTION ALLEGEDLY CONTRAVENING AN ENVIRONMENTAL
INTEREST Is NOT INJURED IN FACT UNLESS SOME OF ITS MEMBERS
RESIDE NEAR THE AFFECTED AREA.

Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe (2d Cir. 1970)
Sierra Club v. Hickel (9th Cir. 1970)
Recently, two federal circuit courts reached seemingly irreconcilable
conclusions concerning whether or not private conservation organizations
have the requisite standing to challenge allegedly unlawful administrative
agency actions. In one case, plaintiffs, a local citizens group, a national
conservation organization, and a municipality of New York, brought
an action requesting that a filling and dredging permit issued by the
Army Corps of Engineers' to the State of New York2 be voided as being
issued beyond the Corps' statutory authority,3 and that an injunction
be granted prohibiting the issuance of another permit or the commencement of construction without congressional consent4 and approval by
the Secretary of Transportation. 5 Defendants sought to have the complaints dismissed on the grounds that the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, and that the plaintiffs did
1. The Corps issued the permit pursuant to its authority under the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1964). Defendants contended that construction of the proposed landfill was referable only to section 10
thereof, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964), which prohibits both the construction or the commencement of construction of any "wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater,
bulkhead, jetty or other structures" in navigable waters of the United States, and
the excavation or the filling in of any navigable waterway of the United States, except
on recommendation by the Chief of Engineers and authorization by the Secretary of
the Army. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 100
n.1 (1970).
2. The New York Department of Transportation planned to place approximately
9,500,000 cubic yards of fill, bound by a rock wall, along a portion of the Hudson
River's bank. The fill was to extend, at its widest point, some 1,300 feet into the
river. Id. at 100.
3. Plaintiffs argued that a dike and a causeway would be constructed, and that,
therefore, section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401
(1964), was the applicable section. This section prohibits the construction of any
"bridge, dam, dike, or causeway" in any navigable river of the United States, unless
the consent of Congress has been given, and the plans have been approved by the
Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army. Id.
4. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964), requires congressional consent for any project involving a dike or a causeway. See note 3 supra.
5. Approval by the Secretary of Transportation is required where construction
of a causeway is proposed by virtue of a provision of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g) (6) (Supp. V, 1970), which transferred certain powers
of the Secretary of the Army, including those under section 401 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act, to the Secretary of Transportation.

(729)
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not have standing to bring the action. The district court disagreed with
both of defendants' contentions, and granted the relief sought by
plaintiffs. 6 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
holding inter alia, that plaintiffs' public interest in environmental resources afforded them standing to challenge administrative agency action
allegedly injurious to that public interest. Citizens Committee for the
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970). In the second
case, plaintiff, the same conservation organization as in Citizens Committee,
brought suit alone requesting that the proposed issuance of permits by
the Secretary of Agriculture 7 to Walt Disney Productions, Inc., for the
purpose of constructing a large-scale commercial-recreational development
within the Sequoia National Forest,8 be enjoined as being illegal and
in qxcess of the Secretary's authority, 9 and that the Secretary of the
Interior be enjoined from issuing a permit for the construction of
electrical transmission lines through park land. 10 Plaintiff also sought
a declaratory judgment of the illegality of the proposal by the Secretary
of the Interior to allow the State of California to construct a new road
through Sequoia National Park." Defendants contended that plaintiff did
not have standing to sue, and that, in any event, they had the necessary
authority to perform those acts sought to be enjoined by the plaintiff.
The district court disagreed with the defendants and granted a preliminary
injunction. 1 2 However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that plaintiff's environmental concern, without the show1969).

6. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y.

7. The Secretary of Agriculture purported to act pursuant to his authority under
the Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1964), which gives the
Secretary authority to make rules and regulations to regulate the occupancy and use
of national forest lands, and to preserve the forests on those lands from destruction.
Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 28 (1970).
8. Disney submitted a proposal to the Forest Service concerning the development of an all-year recreational project in the Mineral King Valley located in the
Sequoia National Forest in California. The Disney proposal was accepted, and Disney
was given a special permit to make studies for a master plan, which, when submitted,
was accepted for implementation, and was the subject of the instant dispute. Id. at 27.
9. Plaintiff contended that the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded his authority
in approving Disney's master plan, specifically attacking the Secretary's proposal to
issue a thirty-year term permit for an eighty acre parcel of land on which construction
of improvements, such as hotels, pools, and parking lots was to begin, and his proposal to issue a revocable permit for additional land (about 13,000 acres) on which
would be constructed such improvements as ski lifts, trails, and sewerage treatment
facilities. Id.
10. The Secretary of the Interior claimed authority to act under 16 U.S.C. § 5
(1964), which permits the laying of electrical transmission lines within national park
lands, if such lines do not interfere with the public interest. Plaintiff contended that
section 5 is controlled by 16 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964), which deals specifically with
Sequoia National Park, and prohibits the issuance of any permit for electrical transmission lines without specific authority from Congress. Id.
11. The Secretary claimed authority for this action under 16 U.S.C. § 8 (1964),
which permits the construction of new access roads into national parks generally. The
state was to construct a new access road to Mineral King Valley, as the former route
was allegedly substandard. This new highway was to be 20.4 miles long, of which 9.2
miles would cross Sequoia National Park. Id.
12. Sierra Club v. Hickel, No. 51464 (N.D. Cal., July 23, 1968).
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ing of a more direct legally protected interest, was not sufficient to grant
the Club standing to challenge administrative agency action. Sierra Club
v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
The major issue facing both courts, upon which they apparently
disagreed, was whether or not a private conservation organization had
standing to challenge administrative agency action. 13 Prior to 1940, the
general rule regarding standing was that one was entitled to sue only
if he was protecting a substantive legal right.1 4 Then in 1940, the
Supreme Court decided FCC v. Sanders Bros.,15 in which the Sanders',
owners of a competing radio station, were permitted to appeal a Federal
Communications Commission decision granting a broadcast license to
another radio station, even though no legal right of the Sanders' was
involved. The Court emphasized that the possible economic harm which
would result from legal competition, although not relevant to the decision
on the merits, was sufficient to afford the plaintiffs standing for the
purpose of litigating the public interest in FCC decisions.'( However,
13. The Citizens Committee court was faced with two other issues. The first
issue was whether or not the court had subject matter jurisdiction. Applying sections

702, 704, and 706, of the Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
(Supp. V, 1970), the court held that it did have the power to judicially review this
act of the Army Corps of Engineers, even though the statute pursuant to which the
agency acted, The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
(1964), does not specifically provide for judicial review. 425 F.2d at 101-02.
The second collateral issue was a constitutional argument raised by plaintiffs.
Their contention was that three delegations of authority to the Commissioner of the
Department of Transportation of the State of New York combined to constitute an
abdication of legislative responsibility for construction of the expressway, thus violating due process. These constitutional arguments were found to be without merit by
the district court. 302 F. Supp. at 1093-94. This finding was affirmed by the circuit
court. 425 F.2d at 106-07.
The Sierra Club court did consider the issue of the merits, although in view
of the fact that it held that plaintiff did not have standing to contest the merits, it
need not have done so. 433 F.2d at 33-38.
14. The Supreme Court apparently meant that one had standing only to enforce
a statute designed to protect his interests, or to enforce a common law right, such as
in property, tort, or contract. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118,
137-38 (1937). See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) ; The Chicago
Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) ; Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United
States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923); and the companion cases of Massachusetts v. Mellon
and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See also K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.04 (1959); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 505-14 (1965) ; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private
Actions,

75

HARV.

L.

REV.

255, 261-71 (1961).

15. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
16. This doctrine was further clarified by Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942), where it was said that "these private litigants have standing
only as representatives of the public interest" (emphasis added).
Standing to appeal agency decisions under the Sanders-Scripps-Howarddoc-trine was reconciled with the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy,
U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2, in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). Discussing the case or controvery requirement,
Judge Frank found that:
In a suit in a federal court by a citizen against a government officer, complaining
of alleged past or threatened future unlawful conduct by the defendant, there is
no justicable "controversy," without which, under article III, § 2 of the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction, unless the citizen shows that such conduct
or threatened conduct invades or will invade a private substantive legally protected interest of the plaintiff citizen; such invaded interests must be either of
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the Court did not consider the question of standing when there was no
threat of substantial economic injury in fact to the one challenging an
7
agency decision.'
8
Subsequently, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,

the Second Circuit seemed to expand the injury in fact concept by
holding that a conservation organization's special interest in preserving
the scenic, recreational, and historical values of an area made it an
aggrieved party when that interest was allegedly disregarded by agency
action, thus giving it standing to appeal an action of the Federal Power
Commission under section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act. 19 By recognizing that the case or controversy requirement of the Constitution 20 does
not necessarily require a personal legal or economic interest before one
can be "aggrieved" by agency action, 21 the Scenic Hudson court became
a "recognized" character, at "common law" or a substantive private legally
protected interest created by statute.
134 F.2d at 700. However, he reasoned that the constitutional requirement was met
when a government official, such as the Attorney General, challenged the constitutional
or statutory authority of another official's action, and that Congress could therefore
enact a statute conferring similar authority on non-official private citizens so that
persons so authorized could bring suit as "private Attorney Generals," thus fulfilling
the controversy requirement without actually litigating a personal legally protected
right. Id. at 704. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.05 (1959).
17. The early cases limited the Sanders-Scripps-Howard doctrine, employing its
test to satisfy standing requirements only where the case involved some direct, substantial threat of economic harm. See, e.g., American Lecithin Co. v. McNutt, 155
F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1946); United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt,
138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943).
However, subsequent decisions allowed intervention upon a showing of a
remote or indirect economic threat. This indicates that the economic injury in fact
test was being liberalized and would be restrictively applied only where the parties
seeking to intervene had no real economic interest to protect. See, e.g., California v.
FPC, 353 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Sunray DX Oil Co. v. FPC, 351 F.2d 395 (10th
Cir. 1965); Lynchburg Gas Co. v. FPC, 336 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Philco
Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Seaboard & W. Airlines v. CAB, 181
F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950) ; Seatrain Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 152 F. Supp. 619 (D. Del. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 181
(1957). See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 257-85
(1965) ; Keller, The Law of Administrative Standing and the Public Right of Intervention, 21 FED. COM. B.J. 134 (1967).
18. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. (1964). 16 U.S.C. § 825(1) (b), specifically grants
judicial review to any party to an FPC proceeding who is aggrieved by a ruling of
the Commission in that proceeding.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See note 16 supra.
21. In reaching its decision, the Scenic Hudson court stated:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect
the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of
power development, those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a
special interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the class of
"aggrieved" parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal Power Act gives
petitioners a legal right to protect their special interests.
354 F.2d at 609 (emphasis added).
For cases granting standing on similar public interest allegations, see
Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 936 (1954). Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) ; FCC
v. Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. 470 (1940) ; International Union of Elec. Workers v.
Underwood Corp., 219 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d
Cir. 1953) ; Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot,
370 U.S. 707 (1943). See also Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private
Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961).
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one of the first courts to clearly depart from the traditional notions
22
of standing.
Subsequent cases have seemingly extended the rationale employed in
Scenic Hudson by predicating standing upon the recognition that the
right of intervention in, or appeal from, agency decisions, which previously had been vested in those parties protecting legal or economic
interests, may also be vested in representative groups of the general
public seeking the protection of other interests. 23 In Road Review League
v. Boyd,2 4 the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York found that the statute pursuant to which the action was
brought made no specific provision for judicial review, 25 similar to those
statutes involved in the instant cases, 26 but unlike the statute in Scenic
Hudson. The court held, however, that the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 27 were sufficient to manifest the congressional intent
that conservation organizations, as well as other citizens' groups, were
to be considered "aggrieved" by agency action allegedly disregarding
their interests even though the particular act pursuant to which that
agency acted did not contain a provision relating to who could challenge
a decision of the agency.28
In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,29 the court
faced the crucial and difficult issue of standing 0 which in this particular
22. There are prior cases which are cited as being based neither on legal nor
economic grounds, but in reality these cases involved the protection of legal or
economic rights, thus fitting within the traditional theories. See Henderson v. United
States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Bebchick v. PUC, 287 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Pollak v. PUC, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 451
(1951). See also Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947); Houston v. CAB, 317
F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
23. One of the leading cases in this area is United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where various citizen groups were permitted to intervene in a television broadcast license renewal hearing. Feeling that the traditional
theories of legal or economic injury, or, in FCC decisions, electrical interference,
were not the exclusive grounds for granting standing, and that Congress did not
intend to limit standing to those theories, the court held that representatives of an
appreciable segment of the listening public had standing to litigate the public interest.
See Keller, The Law of Administrative Standing and the Public Right of Intervention, 21 FED. COM. B.J. 134 (1967).
24. 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
25. Federal-Aid Highways Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1964). However, 23
U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V, 1970), states that the Secretary of Transportation must use
maximum effort to preserve the beauty and historic value of government parklands
and historic sites.
26. Neither statute with which the instant cases are concerned makes any provision for judicial review of agency action taken pursuant thereto. See Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1964), and the Organic Act
of the National Park Service, 16 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
27. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
28. 270 F. Supp. at 661. For other recent cases liberalizing the law of standing,
see, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) ;
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) ; Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424
F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For an extended analysis of four recent Supreme Court
cases in the area, see Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. C1. L. REV.
450 (1970).
29. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).

30. The Supreme Court has observed that the law of standing is a "complicated

specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more
or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations. . . ." United
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case ultimately turned upon the interpretation of the language "person" ...
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute" contained in section 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 3 ' The Citizens Committee court, relying on the Scenic
Hudson precedent 32 as it was interpreted and extended by Road Review
League,8 3 reasoned that plaintiffs' public interest in the resources and
beauty of the threatened area was a sufficient interest to establish their
standing as "persons aggrieved" within the "relevant" statute - the
84
Rivers and Harbors Act.
To further substantiate its conclusion that plaintiffs had standing,
the Citizens Committee court relied upon the Department of Transportation Act 5 indicating that because it related to causeways, which were
the subject of the instant dispute, and evidenced an environmental concern,
it was also a "relevant" statute under section 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.36 Moreover, the court also recognized that Congress had
specifically evidenced an environmental concern for the Hudson Valley's
scenic and historic values by enacting a resolution stating that the
"Hudson River Basin contains resources of immense economic, natural,
scenic, historic, and recreational value to all the citizens of the
United States. . .. "BIT
Similarly, one of the administrative regulations pertaining to the
Corps' authority to issue the disputed filling and dredging permit specifically recommends that the environmental aspects of an area be taken into
States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). In United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1966), Judge (now Chief Justice)
Burger characterized the concept of standing as "a practical and functional one

designed to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate
in a proceeding .... " The Supreme Court has recently cautioned that "[tlhere must
in addition [to adversary interest] be some connection between the official action
challenged and some legally protected interest of the party challenging that action."
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969). It is on this cautionary note, realizing that standing is "one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of the
public law," Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970),

that the issue must be discussed.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970), provides in pertinent part:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
31.

to judicial review thereof.
32. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See note 21
suPra and accompanying text.
33. 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See p. 733 supra.
Similarly, the district court in the instant case found that there was a common

feeling evident in Scenic Hudson and Road Review League, indicating that:
if the statutes involved in the controversy are concerned with the protection of
natural, historic, and scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to give
standing to groups interested in these factors and who allege that these factors
are not being properly considered by the agency.

302 F. Supp. at 1092.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1964).
35. 49 U.S.C. § 1651 etseq. (Supp. V, 1970).
36. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (Supp. V, 1970), states that it is a national policy to
preserve the natural beauty of government parklands and historic sites. Thus,
plaintiffs were "aggrieved" within the meaning of the Transportation Act when this
national policy was disregarded by the agency.
37. Hudson River Basin Compact Act, PuB. L. No. 89-605, 89 Stat. 847 (1966).
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consideration before a permit should be issued.38 Thus, the court concluded "that the public interest in environmental resources - an interest
created by statutes affecting the issuance of this permit - is a legally
protected interest affording these plaintiffs, as responsible representatives
of the public, standing to obtain judicial review of agency action alleged
to be in contravention of that public interest."3 9
In Sierra Club v. Hickel,40 like Citizens Committee, the court concerned itself with the issue of standing. In an effort to distill some guidelines from prior decisional law and the Administrative Procedure Act for
determining whether a particular individual or group has alleged an interest sufficient to establish standing, the Sierra Club court focused upon
the test set forth in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations
v. Camp.41 This test determines that the first inquiry related to the question of standing "is whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action
has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. '42 Citing this test
as the controlling principle, the Ninth Circuit concluded that since "[t] here
is no allegation in the complaint that members of the Sierra Club would
be affected by the actions of defendants-appellants other than the fact that
the actions are personally displeasing or distasteful to them ' 43 plaintiffs
did not establish the interest necessary to give them standing."4
In reaching its decision the Sierra Club court attempted to distinguish
previous decisions, including Citizens Committee, primarily upon their
38. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (1968). See also Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act

of 1934, 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1964) ; Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 742(a)

et seq. (1964) ; Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of the Interior

and the Secretary of the Army, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (11)

39. 425 F.2d at 105.

(1968).

40. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).

41. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
42. Id. at 152. The court elaborated further upon this test by stating that:

The question of standing . . . concerns . . . whether the interest sought to be

protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question ...
That interest, at times, may reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational"
as well as economic values.
Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
The Sierra Club court concluded that this latter language was neither a
supplement nor addition to the initial requirement of "injury in fact." It reached this
conclusion on the basis of prior cases which have refused to adopt a test based on
other than the economic injury in fact criterion. 433 F.2d at 31. See Rasmussen v.
United States, 421 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1970) ; South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970). It is
submitted that this interpretation of Data Processing by the Sierra Club court is not
precisely accurate. See p. 739 infra.
43. 433 F.2d at 33.
44. Plaintiff alleged that its conservation interests would be vitally affected and
aggrieved by the proposed acts of the Secretaries, and particularized those acts it
considered to be in excess of authority and statutory jurisdiction, and an abuse of
administrative discretion. See notes 7, 9, 10, & 11 supra. Encompassing these
arguments was the allegation that the development would permanently destroy the
value of the natural resources of the area, thereby causing irreparable harm to the
public interest. 433 F.2d at 27-28. However, the court concluded that:
such club concern without a showing of more direct interest can [not] constitute
standing in the legal sense sufficient to challenge the exercise of responsibilities
on behalf of all of the citizens by two cabinet level officials of the government
acting under Congressional and Constitutional authority.
433 F.2d at 30.
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facts rather than upon the legal principles espoused. For example, the
court distinguished Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,45
on the ground that the statute involved in that case specifically conferred
upon the plaintiffs substantive legally protected rights, whereas in the
46
instant case, no such statute was applicable.
However, it is submitted that the court's distinction of Scenic Hudson
fails to be persuasive in view of the interpretation and expansion of the
Scenic Hudson rationale by subsequent decisions. Neither the statute
involved in Road Review League47 nor the one in Citizens Committee48
contained any specific provision conferring substantive legal rights on
persons allegedly aggrieved by agency misconduct related to environmental
concerns. Similarly, the court in Powelton Civic Home Owners Association v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,49 granted the
plaintiffs standing in the absence of specific statutory language so providing. 0 Rather, in all three cases the courts applied the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act 5' to establish a basis for standing. Thus,
it would appear that whenever the statute involved does not have a specific
standing provision the court should look to section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act to determine whether the plaintiff has standing. It
is submitted, therefore, that the Sierra Club court apparently misconstrued
45. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
46. The Sierra Club court noted that section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. § 825(1)(b) (1964), gave standing to the Scenic Hudson plaintiffs, see
note 21 supra, but found that in the instant case the Organic Act of the National Park
Service, 16 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964), had no similar provision which would give
these plaintiffs a legally protected right. 433 F.2d at 30.
47. Federal-Aid Highways Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1964).
48. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1964).
49. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
50. In Powelton a civic organization representing citizens who would be displaced by a federal urban renewal project was granted standing under the National
Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970). The court utilized
Scenic Hudson and Road Review League to determine that the Housing Act was the
"relevant" statute conferring a protected legal interest on plaintiffs, thereby giving
them standing under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Powelton
court concluded:
The import of the Scenic Hudson case [and its interpretation in Road Review
League] is that neither economic injury nor a specific, individual legal right are
necessary adjuncts to standing. A plaintiff need only demonstrate that he is an
appropriate person to question the agency's alleged failure to protect a value
specifically recognized by federal law as "in the public interest"; he may then
invoke judicial scrutinization of the agency's performance in protecting - or
failing to protect - that specific value. He has standing to ask whether the
agency action is violative of the public interest.
284 F. Supp. at 826 (emphasis added). Thus, although the Housing Act does not
specifically grant review or standing to public representatives alleging violations of
that act, the Powelton court granted standing based on prior precedent.
However, the Sierra Club court attempted to distinguish Powelton as being
based on a statute conferring substantive legal rights on plaintiffs. It grounded this
distinction on the following statement by the Powelton court:
[W]e are of the opinion that the plaintiffs also have standing in the more
traditional sense: they have substantive legal rights conferred by the National
Housing Act. They have private individual legal rights; and they are the
appropriate representatives of legal rights conferred by the Housing Act on the
general public.
Id. at 821.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970). See note 31 supra.
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these recent decisions as well as disregarded the legislative intent in enacting section 702,52 when it concluded that the section did not apply in this
situation and did not change the existing law of standing.5" Moreover,
it is inconceivable that the precedental value of Scenic Hudson can be
dispensed with by such a tenuous factual distinction.
With respect to the Citizens Committee case, as well as Parker v.
United States, 4 Scenic Hudson, and Road Resiew League, the Sierra
Club court, although recognizing that these decisions granted standing to
conservation groups (including the Sierra Club) to challenge agency action
allegedly infringing upon natural resources, distinguished them on the
factual basis that local residents and groups were joined in those actions,
whereas in the instant action the Sierra Club was the sole plaintiff.55
52. See THE REPORTS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE CoMMrrTEEs ON THE JUDICIARY,
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 185, 233 (1946). See also Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where it was stated that:

in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet chosen to hold that the
Administrative Procedure Act applies to all situations in which a party who
is in fact aggrieved seeks review, regardless of a lack of legal right or specified
statutory language, it is clearly the intent of that Act that this should be the case.
(Emphasis added).
53. The Sierra Club court relied on the concurring opinion of Judge (now Chief
Justice) Burger in National Ass'n of Securities Dealers v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 104 n.5
(D..C. Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 986 (1970), wherein he stated:
[A]lthough the review provisions of the APA were not meant to retard the
judicial development and adaptation of the law of standing, it does not establish
an independent right to review absent judicially articulated notions of "legal
wrong" of "adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of any
relevant statute."
But see note 52 supra for a different conclusion as to the impact of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
54. 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969). The Parker court stated that, although
there were no provisions for review in the applicable statutes - the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 528 et seq. (1964), and the Wilderness Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. (1964) - these statutes were "designed to protect the public
interest in the preservation of the scenic and recreational aspects of certain public
lands." 307 F. Supp. at 687 (emphasis added). The Parker court thus held:
[P]laintiffs are advancing the public interest; also they have special interest in
the values which Congress sought to protect by enacting the . . . statutes. We
conclude that these statutes confer on groups ... such as the plaintiffs the status
of "aggrieved persons" [within the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, when the relevant statutes are violated by an administrative agency.]

Id.
55. The court stated that insofar as Citizens Committee indicated that the Sierra
Club had standing within the "private Attorney Generals" rule expounded in
Associated Industries, see note 16 supra, this court disagreed. The Sierra Club
court felt that there was no statute present in Citizens Committee or in the instant
case which conferred standing on the Sierra Club, or groups like it, to challenge
administrative agency action. 433 F.2d at 33 n.9.
It is suggested, however, that the Organic Act of the National Park Service,
16 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964), is the "relevant statute" in the instant case which may
have given plaintiffs a legally protected right, although not expressly stated, to
challenge the alleged agency misconduct. This Act states that:
[T]he National Park Service . . . shall promote and regulate the use of . . .
national parks ... by such means and measures as to conform to the fundamental
purpose of the said parks . . . which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
16 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) (emphasis added). It is submitted that this language is sufficient
to manifest the congressional intention that the conservational aspects of national
parklands may give rise to a legally protectable right in certain persons alleging
violations of such statutes.
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This distinction, however, cannot seriously be posited as a meaningful
one since had the courts in those cases wanted to do so, they could have
quite easily denied standing to the conservation groups, while permitting
the other plaintiffs to maintain their suits, and still have reached the
same conclusion on the merits. 0 Furthermore, it is submitted that the
respective failures of these courts to exclude such groups cannot be considered as mere oversights on their part. Indeed the Citizens Committee
court explicitly noted the distinction between the local citizens involved
and the clubs when it stated:
Two of the plaintiffs (the Citizens Committee and the Sierra Club)
made no claim that the proposed Expressway or the issuance of the
dredge and fill permit threatened any direct personal or economic
harm to them. Instead they asserted the interest of the public in the
natural resources, scenic beauty and historical value of the area immediately threatened with drastic alteration, claiming that they were
"aggrieved" when the Corps acted adversely to the public interest. 57
On the basis of this asserted interest the Second Circuit granted all plaintiffs standing.5s It is further submitted that the Ninth Circuit, although
suggesting possible factual distinctions, clearly rejected this basis as a
sufficient interest when it denied the Sierra Club standing. By requiring
an assertion that the Club's "property will be damaged, that its organization or members will be endangered or that its status will be threatened" 5
by agency action, the Sierra Club court apparently is reverting to the legal
interest test and the economic injury in fact criterion postulated by the
60
Sanders court in 1940.
56. Indeed, in United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir.
1966), the court stated that:
The usefulness of any particular petitioner for intervention must be judged in
relation to other petitioners and the nature of the claims it asserts as its basis
for standing.
Thus, this court held that not all petitioners had standing, and still reached a decision

on the merits. It is difficult to comprehend why the courts in all of the above cases
did not distinguish between the various plaintiffs and grant standing only to those
alleging economic harm, if they had deemed it necessary to do so before reaching a
decision on the merits.
57. 425 F.2d at 102.
58. The court granted all plaintiffs standing even though the representatives of
the Village of Tarrytown were the only plaintiffs to allege economic injury as their
basis for standing. They claimed that there would be a substantial loss of tax revenues and interference with the urban renewal project already begun. Thus, the Tarrytown representatives' basis for standing was substantially the same as that alleged in
Scenic Hudson. There, the towns that were co-petitioners were afforded standing
because the proposed electrical lines would cause them economic injury in fact in the
form of a decrease in the value of publicly held land, a reduction of tax revenues,
and substantial impairment of future community planning. See also Pittsburgh v.
FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
59. 433 F.2d at 30.
60. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. The suggestion that the Sierra
Club court was concerned solely with the legal interest and economic injury tests is
supported by the fact that the court considered Road Review League, United Church
of Christ, and Data Processing, to be economic injury cases and therefore distinguishable from the instant case, thereby reconciling those holdings with the conclusions
reached in the instant case.
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In so holding, the Sierra Club court was not able to fulfill its apparent
intended purpose - reconciliation of the various tests of standing employed
by prior courts in order to find a unifying legal principle on which to
predicate a single test for standing. Instead, the court made many factual
distinctions, which, rather than clarifying the legal principles involved,
merely proved that reconciliation on factual grounds is not possible in
this area.
Nevertheless, the Sierra Club court's insistence that plaintiffs allege
some identifiable injury is not totally inconsistent with the Data Processing
requirement of alleging injury in fact. Furthermore, since Data Processing is the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement in this area, it must
be looked to as the controlling authority. However, as Judge Hamley
noted in his concurring opinion in Sierra Club, "the Supreme Court [in
Data Processing] made it clear that the clement of legal wrong need not
be economic in nature, but may be aesthetic, conservational or recreational." 61 It is this description of injury in fact which the majority in
Sierra Club seemingly failed to apply, or perhaps misapplied, to the facts
before them. This failure or misapplication, as the case may be, is not
surprising in view of the conceptual difficulty of relating how a conservation group could be injured in fact, even aesthetically, when neither it nor
its members are geographically located near the site of the threatened
62
alteration of nature.
61. 433 F.2d at 38.

62. The conclusion that the standing issue in Sierra Club was controlled by the

fact of proximity of residence has been strongly buttressed by a recent decision of
this same court. Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, Civil No. 22,961 (9th
Cir., filed Jan. 19, 1971). There, plaintiffs, eight individuals and a conservation group,
appealed dismissal of their action for failure to state a claim when they sought to
enjoin the defendants from allegedly destroying the environmental values of San
Francisco Bay by filling in portions thereof in violation of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1964).
The circuit court reversed, with the three judges writing separate opinions
on the issue of standing. Judge Trask, who authored the majority opinion in Sierra
Club, thought that the four plaintiffs "who have property bordering the bay . . . and
reside thereon" alleged a sufficiently personal interest and adverse affect thereon to
be granted standing. Id. at 6. He thought that it was not necessary to reach the
issue of standing with respect to the four remaining individual plaintiffs who did not
reside near the bay. See United Church of Christ v. FPC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966), note 56 supra. However, he would deny the conservation group standing
because it "does not allege that it owns land bordering or near the bay at all [and]
[ilt does not assert that it has any property interests of any kind real or personal
which would sustain 'injury in fact,' . . ." Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California,
supra, at 4.
Judge Merrill thought that all eight individual plaintiffs acquired standing
indicating that "injury in fact to individuals is threatened if their relationship to the
bay, through proximity of residence or regularity of use, is such that in their normal
activities injury to the bay . . . cannot but affect their esthetic, recreational or environmental interests." Id. at 15. He agreed with Judge Trask that the conservation
group should have been denied standing, but apparently on different grounds. He
opined that standing requirements:
[A]ssure that litigation . . . will settle the matter as between the adversaries.
The joining of an association as party can hardly give such assurance as to
those it purports to represent since the rights of its members are not tendered for
adjudication. Individual members are free to relitigate. . ..
Id. at 16.
Judge Hamley would give all eight plaintiffs standing, because "[wihile the
properties upon which these four plaintiffs reside do not border the bay or its lagoons,
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In sharp contrast to the factual setting in Sierra Club is that presented in Citizens Committee wherein the Second Circuit recognized that
"[the Sierra Club is a national conservation organization with substantial
-63
membership . . . in the area of the (proposed) Expressway ....
Although there is broad language in Citizens Committee which would
lead one to believe that the proximity of the members of the challenging
Club to the proposed environmental alteration was not necessary to acquire
standing,6 4 this is the only material fact which reconciles the seemingly
disparate views of the Second and Ninth Circuits, as well as provides
some standard for determining how one can be aesthetically injured in
fact. It should be noted, however, that Citizens Committee was decided
prior to Data Processing, and therefore any attempt to reconcile the two
decisions on this basis is at best theoretical. Nevertheless, it does not
appear that the conclusion of the Second Circuit is inconsistent with that
of the Supreme Court. A brief analysis of the Data Processing opinion
will show why this conclusion is valid. It appears that the Data Processing test is necessarily two-fold. The plaintiff's interest must have been
injured in fact in some way, 65 and the interest which has been injured
or disregarded by the agency must be of a kind sought to be protected
by the applicable statute.6 6 In view of the fact that some members of the
conservation groups resided near the site of the proposed expressway involved in Citizens Committee and assuming that this fact was sufficient
to establish an alleged injury in fact, then the group has met the first
requirement. Similarly, the second requirement was specifically determined to be present when the Second Circuit concluded that "administrative as well as congressional concern for natural resources in the present
'67
exercise of federal authority is evident.
Applying the same type of 'analysis to the Sierra Club case, although
it is arguable that the second criteria is present, 68 unless one takes the
position that pure idealogical interest in the preservation of our environment is sufficient to establish the requisite injury in fact,6 9 it is difficult
this is not a controlling circumstance." Id. at 12. However, he was alone in concluding that the conservation organization had standing. He felt that, on the basis of
the two-pronged test in Data Processing, the group need not have a recognized legal
interest; and he concluded that the group could adequately represent the views of all
of its members as a party to this suit.
Thus, it appears that the true ground of decision in Sierra Club was proximity
to the alleged harm, and that a conservation group which did not assert its own
proximity could not acquire standing.
63. 425 F.2d at 103.
64. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
65. Injury in fact need not be economic in nature. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 42 supra.
67. 425 F.2d at 105.
68. See note 55 supra.
69. See Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and
Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1970), where the
writer interpreted the holding of Data Processing to mean that:
In short, whenever any person feels that a federal administrative agency has
made a decision which does not "promote efforts to prevent or eliminate damage"
to his legally protected interest in the environment he may, as an "aggrieved"
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to conclude on the facts alleged by plaintiffs that they would suffer any
injury in fact by the implementation of the proposed agency action because
it was not alleged that any of the members of the Sierra Club resided near
the site of the proposed development.
In conclusion, therefore, although the Second and Ninth Circuits
apparently applied legal principles inconsistent with each other, and not
entirely consistent with the Data Processing requirements, it is at least
arguable that the conclusions reached by these courts are supportable in
light of those requirements. However, it is submitted that the disparate
results obtained in each case are reflective of the larger problem of defining the permissible limits of the Data Processing "injury in fact" test. 70
To this end it is recommended that, having granted certiorari in Sierra
Club, 71 the United States Supreme Court, along with establishing general
guidelines outlining the standing requirement in environmental lawsuits,
specifically focus upon the question of environmental interest group
standing.
Terry W. Knox

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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United States v. Zeiler (3d Cir. 1970)
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Western. District of Pennsylvania of three bank robberies in two sepaperson under the authority of Data Processing and the APA, bring an action in
federal court to obtain judicial review of the administrative action.

Id. at 1093-94 (emphasis added).

It is submitted that this interpretation of Data Processing is much too broad,
and, in effect, eliminates any requirement of injury in fact in an environmental lawsuit,
which would be an impermissible extension of Data Processing.
70. One question to be considered at this point is whether the ideological plaintiff
concept can come within the ambit of this test. As was previously suggested, the
concept of the ideological plaintiff does not seem to follow from the holding in Data
Processing. See note 69 supra. The ideological plaintiff is necessarily one who has
not been injured in fact; only his ideological beliefs have been infringed. It is submitted that to be injured in fact aesthetically, one must reside in or regularly use the
area in relatively close proximity to the alleged harm, since to allow otherwise, would
be to permit "any person" with any grievance to go into court to obstruct what might
be a perfectly valid exercise of legitimate governmental power.
71. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W.
3353 (U.S., Feb. 23, 1971) (No. 939). It is also noted that Citizens Committee has
been denied certiorari. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S., Dec. 8, 1970) (Nos. 614, 615).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 3

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

rate trials.' The convictions were based, in part, upon evidence obtained
in pre-trial photographic identifications by victims and upon in-court
identifications by the same witnesses. Petitioner appealed his conviction on
grounds that the photographic identifications made in the absence of counsel
(1) violated his sixth amendment rights, and (2) made the witnesses
incompetent for subsequent in-court identifications. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial,
holding that identification testimony by eyewitnesses who had previously
identified defendant through photographs exhibited to them after defendant was in custody and in the absence of counsel was constitutionally
impermissible, and that the subsequent in-court identification was also
inadmissible unless the government established by clear and convincing
evidence that the witnesses were not influenced by the prior improper
photographic identification. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d
Cir. 1970).
Traditionally, an accused's sixth amendment right to be represented
by counsel was limited solely to the time of trial itself. 2 However, in
1932, the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama3 expanded
this right to include the period from arraignment to trial. The Powell
Court held that an accused in a capital case has a right to assigned
counsel as a necessary element of due process of law 4 in order to advise
1. Prior to the first trial, Zeiler moved to suppress testimony of eyewitnesses on
the grounds that it was incompetent as a result of publicity attending his arrest and
arraignment. The motion was denied. United States v. Zeiler, 278 F. Supp. 112
(W.D. Pa. 1968). Subsequently, on August 1, 1967 Zeiler was indicted by a federal
grand jury and charged with the perpetration of eleven bank robberies. Convictions
for two of these robberies were handed down on January 23, 1968. Following the
verdict, the defendant's oral motion for a judgment of acquittal or for a new trial
was denied. In a second trial concluded June 7, 1968 Zeiler and a codefendant were
convicted of a single bank robbery. Following the second trial the defendant filed a
motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial. The motion was denied. United
States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
On June 23, 1967 William Zeiler was arrested, and three days later counsel
was appointed to defend him. On July 6, 1967 a lineup was held attended by the
accused's counsel and fifty persons who had witnessed the various robberies. At trial
it became apparent for the first time that, after Zeiler had been taken into custody
and after counsel had been appointed to defend him but before the corporeal lineup
was held, the FBI had privately confronted the witnesses with a series of photographs
for identification.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, ...
and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense."
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). After Powell, the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938), required the government to furnish counsel to indigent defendants in
federal prosecutions.
4. 287 U.S. at 71. At first, the right was not required in state court proceedings.
In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court held that the right to counsel
applied only to proceedings in a federal court and that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment did not incorporate the specific guarantees of the sixth amendment. Betts appeared unshakeable until Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961),
in which the Court ruled that, at least in Alabama, an arraignment in a capital case
was a critical stage in the proceedings against the accused and therefore, the right to
counsel attached. Betts was later specifically overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), which held that the right to counsel was afforded to defendants
in state criminal proceedings. Finally, to remove all doubt as to their intention, the
Supreme Court in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), held that a preliminary
hearing under Maryland law was as "critical" a stage as arraignment under Alabama
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the accused of his rights and to prepare his defense. Later, in Escobedo
v. Illinois,5 the right to counsel was held to extend to the pre-indictment
stages of the criminal process.6
In 1967, the Supreme Court further expanded the right to counsel
concept in United States v. Wade' where it decided that the right extends to pre-trial and post-indictment identification procedures. In Wade,
the Court held that such confrontations of an accused for purposes
of identification are "critical stages"'s in the proceedings and that the
presence of counsel at this stage would promote fairness through minimizing the possibility of suggestion and by providing defense counsel
with enough information to assure a full hearing at trial on the issue
of identification.9 However, the Court also made it clear that failure
to provide counsel at a pre-trial corporeal identification would not result
in automatic exclusion of subsequent in-court identification evidence,
if the witness could identify the defendant under circumstances in which
it could be shown that the lineup did not unduly influence him. Moreover, the Wade Court indicated that the failure to provide counsel at
the lineup under such circumstances would be considered harmless error
10
and the in-court identification would thus be admissible.
law and, therefore, defense counsel must be present. For a general discussion of the
right to counsel in criminal proceedings, see The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77
HARV. L. REV. 103 (1963) ; Comment, Waiver of the Right to Counsel in State Court
Cases: The Effect of Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U. Cni. L. REV. 591 (1964).
5. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
6. During this critical period the accused must also be warned of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to consult with his lawyer. Id. This position was
later clarified in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 439 (1965), where the Court held
that during a custodial interrogation or whenever an accused is deprived of his
freedom in any significant way, the defendant must be informed in "clear and unequivocal" terms of his constitutional rights including his right to have a lawyer
appointed to represent him.
7. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), established the principle that
any stage before trial could be regarded as "critical" for the purpose of requiring the
assistance of counsel if significant rights, which counsel could help to protect, might
be jeopardized or lost. See note 4 supra.
9. 388 U.S. at 236-38. For a general discussion of the right to counsel at pretrial identification procedures, see Albert, The Right to Counsel at Lineup, 4 CRIM.
L. BULL. 385 (1968) ; Comment, The Right to Counsel During Police Identification
Procedures, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 504 (1967); Comment, The Right to Counsel at
Line-ups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 830 (1969);
Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in
Effective Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 65
(1967); 14 LOYOLA L. REV. 222 (1967); 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 251 (1968).
10. 388 U.S. at 239-43. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). The
Gilbert Court noted that where the testimony of an identifying witness is the direct
result of an illegal lineup, a per se exclusionary rule is the only effective sanction.
See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) ; Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). On the problem of establishing the independent
basis of an in-court identification, see Comment, Due Process Considerationsin Police
Show-Up Practices, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 377, 390 (1969) ; Comment, Right to Counsel
at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in Effective Implementation of an
Expanding Constitution, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 65, 77 (1967) ; 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 251,
256 (1968). On the same day the Supreme Court of the United States decided Gilbert
and Wade it also decided Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), which held that
the Wade case applied only to lineups occurring after the date of the opinion. A
defendant, although not entitled to the application of Wade and Gilbert is entitled
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The presence of the element of suggestion relied on by the Wade
Court in reaching its conclusion was subsequently applied to pre-trial
photo-identification in Simmons v. United States." In Simmons, the
Court established a due process standard whereby convictions based on
photo-identifications would "be set aside only if the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.' 2 Since the petitioner
in Simmons did not base his objections on his right to have counsel
present, the Court relied exclusively on due process standards to determine the admissibility of the photographic identifications. However,
subsequent defenses based on the Simmons rationale have usually been
unsuccessful,' 8 and, as a result, most challenges to photographic identifications have relied on the right to have counsel present during the
identification. Such challenges were grounded upon the argument that
the inherent possibilities of suggestion existing at photographic identification and the attendant difficulties in reconstructing the details of such
an identification for cross-examination purposes are such that the presence
of counsel is necessary to assure fairness to the accused both during the
identification and later at trial. However, prior to Zeiler, few courts had
accepted these arguments 1 4 and it was generally agreed that the proper
to relief in the event the confrontation conducted is so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to inexorable mistaken identification that he is denied due process of law.
See 81 HARV. L. REV. 178 (1968); 19 W. REs. L. REV. 410 (1967).
11. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Petitioners Simmons and Garrett together with William
Andrews, were indicted and tried for the robbery of a Chicago savings and loan
association. All three were found guilty and certiorari was granted to Simmons and
Garrett. Simmons asserted that his pre-trial identification by means of photographs
was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to misidentification as to deny him
due process of law. After the robbery, but prior to arrest, witnesses had been shown
a number of photographs. All of the witnesses identified Simmons from the photographs. Looking to the facts surrounding the identification and applying the due
process standard as set out in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967), the
Court concluded that Simmons' claim must fail.
12. 390 U.S. at 384.
13. For example, in United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969), where the Second Circuit found that the showing of a
series of six photographs, four of them Negroes, did not give rise to the required
likelihood of mis-identification. See also United States v. Sartain, 422 F.2d 387 (9th
Cir. 1970) ; United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
976 (1970) ; United States v. Butler, 405 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 853 (1969). But see United States v. Trivette, 284 F. Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1968).
14. The following courts have considered the claim of the right to counsel at
photographic identifications and have rejected it. United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d
888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969) ; United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d
158 (3d Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1025 (1970) ; McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969) ; United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1056 (1969) ; United States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.
Pa. 1969); United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968); People v.
Padgitt, 264 Cal. App. 2d 443, 70 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1968). For criticism of
the Court's refusal in Marson to extend Wade to photographic identifications, see
Judge Winter's dissenting opinion in United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 652 (4th
Cir. 1968), and 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1019 (1968). See also United States v. Collins,
416 F.2d 696, 700 (4th Cir. 1969). But see Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d
704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969), where the Supreme Court of Nevada recognized the possibility of irreparable suggestion and the difficulties of cross-examination,
and, finding no substantial distinction between a lineup and a substituted photographic
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test to be used was Simmons and that any prejudice resulting from the
identification could easily be revealed by defense counsel upon crossexamination.' 5
In holding that an accused's right to counsel includes counsel's
presence at photo-identifications, the Zeiler court reviewed the considerations which led the Supreme Court in Wade to guarantee the right to
counsel at lineups and noted that these same considerations apply equally
to photographic identifications conducted after the defendant is in custody. 6 Thus, the conclusion in Zeiler rested upon two observations:
(1) the inherent danger of suggestion 17 which contributes to the possibility of mistaken identifications; and (2) the inability of defense counsel
to reconstruct the manner in which the identification procedure was
conducted.' 8
Regarding the first factor, the court recognized that while the use
of photographs may eliminate or diminish some of the potential unfairness found in the lineup proceedings, 19 such diminution of possible prejudice would be outweighed by the increased suggestive influences which
inhere in the use of photographs. 20 For example, the type of photograph
may be a source of suggestive influence if the accused's photo is markedly
21
different from others with respect to pose, mounting, color, or age.
Moreover, the possibility for suggestion increases if the physical characteristics of the suspect evident in the picture differ radically from those
display, concluded that the suspect has a right to counsel. See also Carmichel v.
State, ___Nev
_.
,467 P.2d 108 (1970).

15. In United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968), the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized that photographic displays do present greater opportunities for prejudice than do other types of

investigatory procedure; however, it concluded that any unnecessarily suggestive
pre-trial procedure may be suppressed through cross-examination. See also Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) ; United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158 (3d
Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
16. 427 F.2d at 1307.
17. An example of suggestion presented itself in the Wade case where one of
the witnesses testified on cross-examination that before the lineup she saw Wade
standing in a hall within sight of an FBI agent. 388 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1967). See
also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
18. 427 F.2d at 1307. In United States v. Wade, the Supreme Court noted that:
Insofar as the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom identification in
fact the fruit of a suspect pre-trial identification which the accused is helpless to
subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the accused is deprived of that right of
cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to confront the
witnesses against him.
388 U.S. at 235. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), where the Supreme Court
held that the right granted to an accused by the sixth amendment to confront the
witnesses against him, which includes the right of cross-examination, is a fundamental
right essential to a fair trial.
19. An example of possible unfairness would be using persons who have marked
differences in height.
20. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968); United States v.
Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 653 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J., dissenting) ; United States v.
Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also The Supreme Court, 1966
Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 181 (1967); 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1968); 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 251, 258 (1968).
21. See P. WALL, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 81-82 (1965).
See also United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 653 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
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of other subjects. 22 These suggestive features will obviously have the
effect of placing greater emphasis on the photograph of the suspect.
Additionally, direct suggestive comments or gestures by the police
may also influence the witness's objectivity at a photo-identification. An
accused's picture may be singled out by either pointing directly to the
photograph of the suspect 23 or by asking leading questions referring to
one particular suspect which describes his physical characteristics. 24 Even
the most scrupulous police officer may unwittingly influence the identification by the manner in which he places the photographs before the
witness or the order in which he hands them to him. 25 Indeed, the accused's image may recur so often in a series of pictures that attention is
automatically drawn to it. 26 Suggestion may even result from the influence of one witness upon another if there are several witnesses present
27
at the identification.
In addition to the finding that the dangers of suggestion inherent
in a corporeal identification are equally prevalent in a photographic
identification, 2 the Zeiler court also found that the problem may be
even greater in a picture identification. This finding is based upon the
premise that while corporeal identifications are not completely reliable
even under the best conditions, they are nevertheless considered superior
to photographic identifications. This conclusion seems reasonable since
photographs present a two dimensional image which is "frozen" and thus
dissimilar to the living, moving subject originally viewed by the observant. 29 Indeed, there is no question that the human mind is extremely
susceptible to external suggestive influences30 and this susceptibility could
result in the creation of nonexistent memories or in the alteration of
22. In Zeiler the identifying witnesses were confronted with eight photographs,
five of different individuals and three of Zeiler. The pictures of the other men were
police "mug shots"; those of Zeiler were ordinary snapshots. In addition, Zeiler was
pictured wearing eyeglasses, as the actual perpetrator of the robbery had done. 427
F.2d at 1308. An analogous situation may present itself in a corporeal lineup where
physical characteristics of the lineup participants differ.
23. See Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades - Part I, 1963 CRIM.
L. REV. (England) 479, 483; Comment, Possible Procedural Safeguards Against
Mistaken Identification By Eyewitnesses, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 552, 554 (1955).
24. See Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 23.
25. United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 653 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
26. See P. WALL, supra note 21, at 74-77. The danger is increased, of course,
if the police display only the picture of the individual who generally resembles the
person he saw. Id. Also the chance of suggestion is increased if the police indicate
to the witness that they have other evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the crime. Id. at 82-83.
27. Suggestion may have a greater effect if the witnesses' original observation of
the suspect was impaired by poor conditions such as distance. Cf. Williams &
Hammelmann, supra note 23, at 483. Emotional excitement may also leave a witness
open to suggestion. Comment, supra note 23, at 554.
28. 427 F.2d at 1307.
29. See People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 631, 354 P.2d 865, 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1960). See also P. WALL, supra note 21, at 70; 23 VAND. L. REv. 162, 165 (1969).
30. See generally P. WALL, supra note 21. Frequently subsequent events will
influence a witness's recollection of prior occurrences.
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memories of existing events. 31 Additionally, since juries give much more
weight to the identification of a criminal defendant than to almost any
other kind of evidence,32 it becomes apparent that photo-identifications
may lead to an even greater number of misidentifications than corporeal
identifications.
Regarding the second factor concerning the inability of defense
counsel to effectively cross-examine the observing witnesses, the court
rejected the argument that defense counsel would have an opportunity
to attack the reliability of the photo-identification at trial by reconstructing on cross-examination any unfair situations which had previously
occurred. 33 This argument was similarly rejected by the Wade Court
regarding corporeal identifications. 34 It is submitted that the Zeiler Court
was correct on this point since the inability of defense counsel to reconstruct
the circumstances surrounding an identification is more acute in a picture
identification85 because the defendant himself is not present. 36 Furthermore, since the opportunity to reconstruct the possible suggestiveness and
unfairness of the photographic identification is de minimus, the defendant
has no meaningful opportunity to attack the credibility of the identifying
witness. 37 Despite this shortcoming, however, many courts have taken
the position that the details of the photographic identification may be
reconstructed at trial and any resulting prejudice vitiated by admitting
the actual pictures used into evidence.38 While it does seem that the
31. See E. BORCHARD, Convting the Innocent, xiii (1932). See also M. POST,
The Man Hunters 26 (1926).
32. See Comment, supra note 23, at 552.
33. Many courts have concluded that such reconstruction is possible. See United
States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224, 227 (W.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Clark,
289 F. Supp. 610, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1968); People v. Padgitt, 264 Cal. App. 2d 443,
449, 70 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (Ct. App. 1968). See also cases cited in note 15 supra.
See also Comment, The Right to Counsel at Line-up: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower
Courts, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 830, 851 (1969).
34. 388 U.S. at 230. The Wade Court noted that neither witnesses nor lineup
participants are apt to be alert for conditions prejudicial to the suspect. However,
even if they were it is unlikely that they would detect the potential prejudice since
they are not schooled in the practice. Moreover, emotional tension which accompanies
a lineup may cause participants to be less observant. Beyond the inability of witnesses to detect suggestive influences at a corporeal lineup, an additional impediment
is the physical conditions surrounding the conduct of the lineup. Id. at 230 n.13. In
many situations, lights shine on the stage in such a way that the suspect cannot see
the witnesses. See Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1968). In some, a one-way mirror is used and the suspect can
neither see nor hear the witness. See Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 711 n.2
(3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966). As a result, "numerous defendants . . . are unable to ferret out suggestive influences in the secrecy of the confrontation." 388 U.S. at 234-35.
35. 427 F.2d at 1307.
36. Obviously, nothing could be accomplished with more secrecy and, therefore,
be more prejudicial than an identification without the suspect. Furthermore, "the
out of court identification by photograph may never come to light since the defendant
was not a participant therein." 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 251, 258 (1967). In Zeiler, the
pre-trial identification did not come to light until after the trial had begun. 427 F.2d
at 1306.
37. 427 F.2d at 1307.
38. United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also
Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969),
where the Supreme Court of Nevada noted that if the actual pictures involved in the
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credibility of the actual photographs might be established in this manner,
it is submitted that this type of reconstruction would be ineffective since
the possible prejudice at the time the photographs were displayed would
still remain. Furthermore, since most witnesses "are [not] likely to be
schooled in detection of suggestive influences," 3 9 any attempt at reconstruction seems futile. Adequate recognition of the inherent suggestiveness
in photo-identification and of the impossibility of accurately reconstructing
the identification procedure at trial would seem to almost compel the
40
Zeiler court's decision.
In addition to the above considerations, the instant holding was
further grounded upon the proposition that the constitutional safeguards
of Wade would be completely nullified if the police were able to privately
confront witnesses with suggestive photographs prior to the lineup.41
However, the court's fear that the absence of counsel at photographic
identifications would encourage the police to abuse the identification
process 42 seems somewhat misplaced in light of the fact that most authorities believe that the majority of improper identifications result from
dangers inherent in all eye-witness identification 43 rather than from deliberate police procedures designed to prejudice an accused. 44 It seems
that the major source of prejudice to the accused will flow from the fact
that most physical identifications are preceded by a photo-identification. 45
This sequence results in the inherent suggestiveness of the photoidentification procedures carrying forward to any subsequent identification at a lineup. 46 It is very likely that a witness may base a physical
identification upon his recollection of the accused's picture rather than
photo-identification could be preserved and guidelines initiated and followed for these
procedures, the presence of counsel would not be required.
39. 388 U.S. at 230.
40. 427 F.2d at 1307.
41. Id.
42. Id. See also United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 654 (4th Cir. 1968)
(Winter, J., dissenting).
43. See p. 745 supra.
44. See Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 23, at 482. The Court in Wade
also assumed that suggestive influence was not the result of police procedures intentionally designed to prejudice an accused. 388 U.S. at 235.
45. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. United States, 391 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1968) ; United
States v. Hutto, 393 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Cline v. United States, 395 F.2d 138
(8th Cir. 1968) ; Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d 171 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 863 (1968) ; United States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
In England it would be regarded as most improper to show a photograph
to a witness who is about to inspect a parade. See Williams & Hammelmann, supra
note 23, at 484-85, for criticism of this practice. The practice of showing a suspect's
picture to a witness prior to a lineup may be grounds for reversal. Rex v. Goss,
17 Crim. App. 196 (1923).
46. In State v. Galloway, 247 A.2d' 104 (Me. 1968), a witness was shown fifteen
or twenty photographs of various persons on two occasions but rejected all of them.
On a third occasion she was shown two photographs of the accused and immediately
identified him. Consequently, she was able to identify the suspect at a later corporeal
confrontation. The Supreme Court of Maine noted that the witness was not prompted
or assisted by the officers in her identification. However, the court failed to point
out that inherent suggestion was, nevertheless, distinctly possible since the witness
only viewed two pictures of the defendant.
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upon an independent recollection formed at the time the crime was
committed.4 7 In effect, the subsequent identification of the accused may
merely show that the picture was a good likeness. 4s Furthermore, a witness may be reluctant to contradict his prior identification at a subsequent lineup 49 thus rendering the presence of counsel at the lineup a

useless gesture, since the identification would already have been made.5 0
Thus, the foregoing could result in an unreliable corporeal identification
even though the accused's constitutional rights have been fully protected
in accordance with Wade.51
After deciding that an accused must be afforded counsel during a
pre-trial photo identification, the Zeiler court addressed itself to the application of the exclusionary rule holding that: (1) evidentiary use of
2
the improper photographic identification was to be excluded per se;5
and (2) in-court identification of the accused would be admissible only
if the prosecutor could establish "by clear and convincing evidence" that
the witnesses were not influenced by the prior photographic identification.53 This rule, it is submitted, is fair because it allows the prosecutor
the opportunity to obtain an in-court identification when his case rests
heavily on eye witness identification. The guidelines set forth in Wade for
determining the independence of in-court identifications when a corporeal
lineup has been conducted could presumably be followed in determining
the taint of a photographic identification. These guidelines include: (1)
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act; (2) the existence
of a discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's
actual description; (3) any identification prior to the lineup of another
person; (4) the failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and
54
(5) the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification.
47. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968), the Supreme

Court noted that:
Regardless how the initial misidentification comes about, the witness is apt to
retain in his memory the image of the photograph rather than of the person
actually seen...
See also Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 23, at 486; Comment, supra note 23,
at 553-54.
48. Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 23, at 484.
49. Id. at 482.
50. 427 F.2d 1307. Counsel will be able to observe any prejudice at these subsequent proceedings, but he will never be able to calculate completely all the prejudicial
influence the previous photographic display had on the victim. It is this possible
prejudical proceeding which may ultimately determine the defendant's identification,
thereby violating his constitutional rights. For these reasons, some courts have
prohibited an in-court identification which followed an unreliable photographic display.
See United States v. Washington, 292 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1968) ; United States v.
Trivette, 284 F. Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1968).
51. See United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696, 701 (4th Cir. 1969) (Winter, J.,
dissenting) ; 23 VAND. L. REV. 162, 165 (1969) (when a photographic identification precedes a corporeal lineup the Wade and Gilbert protections could easily be emasculated).
52. 427 F.2d at 1307.
53. Id. at 1307-08. See p. 743 and note 10 supra.
54. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
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While these guidelines suggest that independent in-court identification is
possible, doubts have been expressed concerning its practicability since a
court can never know with any degree of certainty if the in-court identification is free of any taint. 55 In fact, the four Justices who dissented in
Wade5" were of the opinion that such a task was impossible.5 7
In the final analysis, whether such a burden is sustainable would
appear to depend on the interpretation given to the "clear and convincing
evidence" requirement. If the prosecutor is required to prove that the
in-court identification is independent of the illegal lineup, to the extent
that the "clear and convincing evidence" requirement approaches the
reasonable doubt standard5" the exclusionary rule may very well be
too harsh. Its seems that the prosecutor will have to prove a sequence of
events prior to the photographic display which would have allowed the
witness to make a correct identification without the taint of the photographic display. These events will probably include the opportunity the
witness had to observe the suspect at the time of the crime as well as
other situations tending to prove that the witness had knowledge of the
identity of the defendant. However, since the technique of identification
is most often employed in cases in which the witness views the suspect
only for a short period of time and while in a condition of emotional
stress, the likelihood that the prosecutor will meet this interpretation
of the requirement would seem to be minimal. On the other hand, if
the "clear and convincing evidence" requirement is only a question of
probabilities, it would seem that the exclusionary rule becomes fairer for
the prosecutor. However, by allowing the prosecutor to use this lower
evidentiary standard to establish an untainted in-court identification, a
suspect's rights may be jeopardized since the in-court identification may
not be completely free of prejudice arising from the questionable photographic display.
Although the Zeiler court has determined that counsel's presence at
the identification proceedings will aid in lessening the suggestiveness
inherent in photo-identifications, the role that defense counsel will assume
at the actual identification is not clear. 59 Since identification procedures
55. See 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 377, 391 (1969)

(suggestion that a lineup prior to trial

would aid as a preliminary check on the accuracy of the lineup) ; 63 Nw. U.L.

REV.

251, 256 (1968). See also The Role of the Defense Lawyer at a Lineup in Light of
the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 273, 284-85 (1968).

56. 388 U.S. at 243.
57. Id. at 248, 250-51.
58. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court expressed the view
that the in-court identification should be free of the taint of the illegal lineup beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 274.
59. Many courts have been unwilling to extend the right to counsel to phoegraphic identifications because they are of the opinion that the traditional role of

counsel does not extend to proceedings where the defendant himself is not present.
See United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir. 1969) (the classical analysis

of the assistance to be given by counsel does not include his presence when the prosecution is interrogating witnesses in the defendant's absence) ; United States v. Conway,
415 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1969) (no form of confrontation) ; United States v.
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do not violate a defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination," °
it is certain that counsel could not prevent the photographic display,6 '
and it is questionable whether he could insist that the exhibition of
photos be replaced by a more desirable procedure or accomplished in
a less prejudicial manner.6 2 However, it would seem that counsel should
be permitted to offer suggestions as to the methods used in the identification, 63 and at least act as a passive observer. 64 In the latter capacity,
through the use of his knowledge of the procedure he would be able to
reconstruct the circumstances of the identification at trial and question
the credibility of the identifying witnesses through more effective crossexamination. Moreover, it seems clear that while his traditional role
would be somewhat altered, counsel could nevertheless effectively pre65
serve crucial rights of the accused.
Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 649 (4th Cir. 1968) (the rationale of Wade and Gilbert should
not be extended to photographic identifications since one of the prime factors underlying those decisions was the presence of the accused).
But the traditional role of counsel is not to be so narrowly defined or to be
given so much weight that it overrides the defendant's right to a fair trial. Since
a corporeal lineup is a critical stage where the defendant is assured of his right to
counsel, and since the same prejudice involved in such a lineup is present in a photographic identification, it would seem that the latter is also a critical stage which involves the substantial rights of the accused that should be protected by the "guiding
hand" of counsel. See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 181
(1967) ; Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390, 395 (1966); 43 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1017, 1201 (1969) ; 23 VAND. L. REv. 162, 166 (1969).
60. The fifth amendment privilege protects an accused from being compelled to
testify against himself, or to provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). "[C]ompelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution
witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having
testimonial significance." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967). A
similar result would follow for a photographic display since photographs are really
representations of individuals on a frozen surface.
61. Eight members of the Court in Wade agreed that a lineup per se is not a
violation of the right against self-incrimination and, consequently, until the rights of
the accused are established, defense counsel cannot cite the lineup as a violation of
the constitutional provision. With no authority to object to the lineup or a photographic display, a lawyer is powerless to act.
62. One of the underlying assumptions of the Wade decision is that counsel's
presence itself would have a prophylactic effect on police practices. However, if the
police fail to conduct a substantially fair lineup or photographic display, whether
intentional or otherwise, counsel could hardly compel the police to adhere to his
standard of fairness in the light of the fact that the Wade Court failed to even
suggest what the role of counsel might be in averting possible prejudice. See 43
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1017, 1024 (1968) (counsel may not insist that the police adhere to
his standards of fairness).
63. Nothing in Justice Brennen's opinion in Wade seems to indicate that counsel
may suggest possible alternatives to avoid prejudice or that the police have to listen
to him. However, Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, noted that ". . . there is
an implicit invitation to counsel to suggest rules for the lineup and to manage and
produce it as best he can." 388 U.S. at 259.
64. Most commentators seem to agree that counsel will be allowed to function
in this capacity. See Comment, The Right to Counsel During Pre-TrialIdentification
Proceedings- An Examination, 47 NEB. L. REV. 740, 748-49 (1968) ; Note, Lawyers
and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390, 396 (1967); 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 251, 259 (1968)
(raising a question of ethical problems counsel is faced with when he acts merely
as an observer, and then as a witness at trial).
65. For a full discussion of the possible role of counsel at extra-judicial identifications and some alternatives to the counsel requirement, see Comment, supra note 63,
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Militating against the positive aspects of the protections afforded
the accused are the practical problems of: (1) considerable delay preventing the early release of innocent suspects and delaying the commencement of a new investigation ;66 and (2) impediment of the government's
ability to investigate cases and apprehend suspects.6 7 Moreover, the Wade
suggestion that substitute counsel be utilized to protect the suspect's rights
where circumstances would not permit the accused to reach his lawyer
immediately" does not seem to adequately answer this problem since
the defendant's rights might be compromised to the extent that inadequate preparation for trial results. Deficient preparation could occur
particularly in situations where substitute counsel is required to take a
more active part in the criminal process; for example, at interrogation
proceedings. However, assuming that this consideration is accurate, it
is submitted that substitute counsel still could provide the accused with
effective protection during a photographic display in light of the fact
that his primary role is that of a passive observer. His observations, if
they were made with a focus to inherent prejudice, 69 could be relayed
to defendant's own counsel or presented at trial in order to aid in the
reconstruction of the pre-trial identification procedure. Furthermore,
Zeiler would not seem to impede the use of photo-identifications during
investigation and apprehension since the court expressly limits its rule
to points in time when the accused is already in custody. 70
at 748-58 (1968) ; Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings:
A Problem in Effective Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. PiTT.
L. REv. 65 (1967); Note, supra note 63, at 396-402.

66. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 255 (1967) (White, J., dissenting).
67. The Wade Court rejected this contention stating that:

[T]o refuse to recognize the right to counsel for fear that counsel will obstruct
the course of justice is contrary to the basic assumptions upon which this Court
has operated in sixth amendment cases.
388 U.S. at 237-38.
68. 388 U.S. at 237. See Comment, supra note 63, at 754-55, for criticism of the
idea of substitute counsel.
69. The Wade Court mentioned the possibility that substitute counsel might
suffice in circumstances which would result in prejudicial delay by noting that
"substitute counsel may be justified on the ground that the substitute counsel's presence may eliminate the hazards which render the lineup a critical stage for the presence
of the suspect's own counsel." 388 U.S. at 237 n.27.
70. 427 F.2d at 1307. But see United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158, 162 (3d
Cir. 1969) ; McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434, 436 (10th Cir. 1968) (counsel is
not required because these procedures are mere preparatory steps for trial). Photographic identifications prior to arrest do serve important functions of contributing to
the apprehension of offenders and of sparing innocent suspects the ignominy of arrest
by allowing eye-witnesses to exonerate them. However, neither of these functions
are fulfilled once the suspect has been taken into custody. Thus the Zeiler court
recognized the importance of the use of photographs as an important tool in investigating unsolved crimes and apprehending suspects and at the same time effectuated
a proper rule for police enforcement. In doing so, the court distinguished Simmons
by noting that the photographic identification in that case occurred prior to arrest
and was part of the investigation process. The Zeiler court did not specifically define
the term custody; however, it is a distinct possibility that the court was using the
term in the manner in which the Supreme Court used it in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). There the term "custody" was defined to mean that a person was
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Should the ultimate conclusion be reached that the police administration problems raised by Zeiler are insurmountable, it is submitted
that there are alternative safeguards other than the presence of counsel
that could guarantee fairness at photo-identifications. 7' As suggested
by the Wade Court, there might be no need to declare the pre-trial
identification a critical stage if proper legislative or police standards
of conduct concerning such identifications were in widespread use. Such
standards could be monitored through employing a disinterested party
to view the process and later presented in court, through conducting the
proceedings before a judicial magistrate who could make it a matter of
record, or through using sound and pictorial devices to facilitate later
reconstruction. 72 Creative use of effective guidelines with attendant enforcement procedures would provide a reviewable process in which the
risk of suggestiveness could be eliminated and a record for defense counsel's use preserved.
In conclusion, the Zeiler court has extended the criminal defendant's
right to counsel to an area of the criminal process relatively untouched
since Wade. It is submitted that this is a necessary step because the inherent suggestiveness in photo-identifications is such that in the absence
of other safeguards, the presence of counsel is required in order to insure
the defendant's right to a fair trial. Moreover, this extension of the right
to counsel assures the accused that when a photo-identification precedes
a corporeal lineup any prejudice occurring at the former will be detected,
thereby preserving the constitutional rights afforded by Wade at the
later lineup procedure. Indeed, when other state and federal courts are
faced with the issue presented in the instant case, the Zeiler rationale
will offer strong support for holding that the right to counsel must be
afforded a criminal defendant at an in-custodial photographic identification.
Stephen J. Polaha
taken into custody or "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Id. at 444.
71. 388 U.S. at 239. For a discussion of possible regulations which might be
implemented for the photo-identification, see P. WALL, supra note 21, at 73-85. For
a similar discussion relating to line-up procedures, see Murray, The Criminal Lineup
at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 610, 627-28.
72. See 3 J. WIGMoRu, Evidence § 786(a) (B) (4) (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore
suggests the application of science to police methods in the application of a "talking
film" in the identification of arrested persons. He suggests that one hundred talkingpictures of men and women in a variety of occupations, race-origins, ages, etc., and
in a variety of dress and poses would be prepared in advance. The picture would last
two minutes, in the last minute the suspect would read aloud a standard uniform
passage. The films would be classified according to physical features. The person
arrested would be filmed in a similar manner. An electronic device would register
the response of the witness who would view twenty-five pictures and the degree of
positiveness in the response.

Later, this record could be used to cross-examine

the witness.
One author has suggested that this procedure would be less expensive than
the requirement of counsel at the identification process. See Comment, supra note 33,
at 852. This type of procedure would also eliminate the possibility of delay in releasing
innocent suspects and commencing a new investigation.
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In re Antazo (Calif. 1970)
Petitioner was indicted on several counts of arson and conspiracy.J
He entered a guilty plea to the arson charge, received a three-year suspended sentence, and was ordered to pay a fine of $2,500, plus a penalty
assessment of $625, or, in lieu of payment thereof, to be imprisoned in
the county jail one day for each $10.00 unpaid.2 Because he was an indigent,8 petitioner could not pay the fine and thus was incarcerated. 4 He
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the California Penal
Code sections which authorized the fine and penalty, and the imprisonment in default thereof, 5 were unconstitutional as applied to him, since
they resulted in his imprisonment solely because of his indigency. The
Supreme Court of California granted the writ, 6 holding that imprisonment of an indigent because of his inability to pay the fine imposed upon
1. The specific charges were arson, CAL. PENAL CODE § 448(a) (West 1970),
arson of insured property, CAL. PENAL CODE § 450(a) (West 1970), and conspiracy
to commit said substantive offenses, CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(1) (West 1970).
2. After entering his guilty plea petitioner was released on his own recognizance
and while he remained at large he testified for the prosecution at the trial of his
alleged co-conspirator, one Clausman. After Clansman's conviction he and petitioner
were simultaneously arraigned for judgment. The sentencing judge reviewed the
records of both men and stated that he considered both of them "as standing in the
same and identical shoes before the court with respect to these matters," and entered
identical sentences accordingly. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 106, 473 P.2d 999, 1001,
89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 257 (1970). Clausman, who was not an indigent, paid the fine
portion of his sentence and was released immediately.
3. The court did not indicate what standard of indigency was used in the
instant case. For discussion of current approaches to determining indigency for the
purposes of criminal procedure, see Note, DiscriminationsAgainst the Poor and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 435, 443 (1967).
4. Petitioner's total imprisonment did not exceed the maximum authorized by
statute for the substantive offense to which he had pleaded guilty. The maximum prison
sentence provided under CAL. PENAL CODE § 448(a) (West 1970), is twenty years.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (West 1970), provides for default imprisonment
for failure to pay a penal fine. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13521 (West 1970), authorizes the
penalty assessment. The question whether defendant could be imprisoned for failure
to pay his section 13521 penalty assessment was not reached by the court because of
its disposition of the equal protection issue.
6. Respondents contended that habeas corpus could not be granted because petitioner did not take a timely appeal from the judgment. The court, however, said
that the requirement that a petitioner exhaust his appellate or other remedies before
applying for habeas corpus is a discretionary policy which may be waived under
special circumstances. The special circumstances found in the instant case were the
fact that petitioner presented a constitutional question of "great magnitude." 3 Cal.
3d at 107, 473 P.2d at 1002-03, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59.
The court also noted that it saw no significant difference in the fact that
petitioner's fine and penalty assessment had been imposed as a condition of probation
in the court's probation order rather than in a judgment of conviction after denial of
probation. In the court's opinion the same constitutional principles would govern in
both situations. 3 Cal. 3d at 116, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss4/3

26

Editors: Recent Developments

APRIL

1971 ]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

him was not necessary to promote the state interests claimed and constituted an invidious discrimination, on the basis of wealth, in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7 In re Antazo,
3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
The practice of imprisoning a convicted defendant for nonpayment
of a fine is as old as the common law itself." In the United States it is
authorized in all states and by federal statute.9 The traditional argument
advanced in justification of the practice is that it is a coercive device
employed to obtain payment of the fine, and not a substitute form of
punishment for the offense. 10
Some jurisdictions have attempted to mitigate the impact of the practice upon those who are unable to pay by providing for early release upon
a showing of indigency," and several permit deferred or installment payment of the fine. 12 A few states place statutory limitations upon the permissible term for default imprisonment.'5 In those states which have no
such limitations, however, courts have generally taken the position that
alternative fine or imprisonment sentences are permissible because they
are within the wide scope of discretionary powers granted to the sen14
tencing judge.
7. U.S.

CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1.

See generally J. BISHOP, A. TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 693 (9th ed. 1923)
J. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 119-23 (1927); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 43-44, 46 (3d ed. 1923) ; 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57 (1883). For an excellent treatment of the history of
fines and imprisonment, see Note, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars
or Thirty Days," 57 CALIF. L. REV. 778 (1969).

8.

9. The federal statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1964).

The state statutes are cited

and annotated in the Appendix to Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 246-59 (1970).
10. See, e.g., Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732, 736 (D. Md. 1968) ; Ex parte
Brady, 70 Ark. 376, 380, 68 S.W. 34, 35 (1902); Ex parte Garrison, 193 Cal. 37,

38, 223 P. 64 (1924) ; People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d
972 (1966); McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N.Y. 393, 396, 26 N.E.2d 949, 950 (1940).
11. The Federal Poor Convict Law, 18 U.S.C. § 3569 (1964), provides for release
on petition after thirty days' confinement for nonpayment of a fine. See also ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.030 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-9 (1963) ; HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 712-4 (1968) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964) ; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 145 (1958), § 146 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-2-9(B) (Supp. 1969) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-24 (1965) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 57,
§ 15 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 169.160 (1967); PA. STAT. tit. 39, § 323 (1954);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-574 (1962).
12. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (West 1970)
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2901 (1953) ; MD.ANN. CODE art. 52, § 18 (Supp. 1970) ; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 1 (Supp. 1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.3
(1968) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-15 (1953) ; PA. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 953, 956 (1964) ;
S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-593 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.82.030 (1961); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 57.04 (Supp. 1970).
13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1648 (1956) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205
(West 1970) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4103(a), (b) (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970) ; LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art.
884 (West Supp. 1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1904 (West 1964); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 42-1-60 (1964) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.14 (Page 1954); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §

62-4-10 (1966).
14. See, e.g., Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968); United
States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 345 F.2d 533
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965) ; Wade v. Carsley, 221 So. 2d 725 (Miss.
1969) ; State v. Hampton, 209 So. 2d 899 (Miss. 1968) ; State v. Lavelle, 54 N.J. 315,

255 A.2d 223 (1969) ; State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (App. Div.
1969) ; People ex rel. Loos v. Redman, 48 Misc. 2d 592, 265 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

The development of an equal protection basis for attacking default
imprisonment began with Griffin v. Illinois,15 in which the Supreme
Court employed the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
in a significant effort to ameliorate economic discrimination against indigents who are thrust into the maelstrom of the criminal justice system.
In Griffin, where petitioners had not been able to appeal their conviction
because they were too poor to buy a stenographic transcript of their trial,
it was held that if a transcript was necessary in order to obtain adequate
appellate review, then equal protectic-n required that indigent defendants
be provided with such a transcript at state expense.16 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court used a two-step reasoning process. First, it stated
that a law which is nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation, and that such a discriminatory result, even if unintended, could be challenged on equal protection grounds.17 Finding such a
discriminatory result on the facts before it, the Court reasoned that since a
defendant's ability to pay the costs of appeal bore no rational relationship
to the question of his guilt or innocence, discrimination on account of
poverty in criminal trials was fully as invidious as discrimination according
to race, creed or color, and was thus violative of equal protection.'"
Since the focus in Griffin was limited to the period during which guilt
or innocence is determined, i.e., the trial and appeal, there was judicial
uncertainty whether the equal protection rationale advanced therein was
applicable to sentencing proceedings. A few courts held that it did apply,"9
1966) ; People ex rel. Crockett v. Redman, 41 Misc. 2d 962, 246 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup.

Ct. 1964) ; Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.W. 175 (1925). See also Hill v.
Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1936) and Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), in which
the Supreme Court tacitly approved of the practice, although the issue of its application to indigents was not raised.
15. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16. Id. at 19-20.
17. Id. at 17 n.11. Prior to Griffin the Court had held unconstitutional statutes
which were nondiscriminatory on their face but which were applied in a discriminatory

manner, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese applicants denied licenses
to operate laundries) ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ("grandfather
clause" in Oklahoma constitution held discriminatory against Negroes). However,

this was the first time the Court attacked a discriminatory result which was produced
neither by express statutory provision nor by intentionally discriminatory application
of neutral statutes. At the very least this development means that the "mere state of
being without funds" can no longer be characterized as "constitutionally an irrelevance," Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring),
but the extent to which the state will be required to compensate for financial differ-

ences continues to be an open question. See Mr. Justice Harlan's vigorous dissent

in Griffin, 351 U.S. at 35-36, and note 41 infra. For an analysis of the new standards
of equality developing in the area of criminal procedure and in other constitutionally
protected areas, see Note, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1065, 1177-90 (1969).
18. 351 U.S. at 19. Griffin was decided on due process as well as equal protection
grounds; however, since Antazo was decided only on the basis of equal protection,
this Note will concentrate primarily on equal protection. For a discussion of the
interplay of the two concepts in recent cases, see Note, supra note 3, at 435-39. See
also note 39 infra.
19. See, e.g., People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972
(1966), and cases cited note 20 infra. See also dissenting opinions asserting equal
protection arguments in Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(Edgerton, J., dissenting) ; Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969)
(Winter, J., dissenting in part); State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70
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but some of these holdings dealt only with the per diem rates at which
fines were to be discharged during imprisonment. 20 Other courts rejected
the contention that the Griffin rationale applied in any way to the question
21
of default imprisonment of indigents.
This uncertainty was resolved by the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Illinois.22 There, appellant was convicted of petty theft and received the
maximum sentence provided by law - one year's imprisonment and a
$500 fine. Since he could not pay the fine due to his indigency, he was
to remain in prison and "work off" the monetary obligation at the rate of
five dollars per day in addition to his one-year sentence. The Court, placing great emphasis upon Griffin, held that an indigent offender could not
be imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine or court costs for a period in
excess of the maximum term authorized as punishment for the substantive
offense. 23 Chief Justice Burger, delivering the opinion of the Court, reasoned that once the state had by statute defined the "outer limits of
' 24
incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies,
thereafter to subject a certain class of convicted defendants to an additional term solely by reason of their indigency was to create a discrimination based on ability to pay which violated equal protection. Since the
state's avowed purpose in confining an indigent beyond the statutory maximum was to compel payment through the "working out" of the fine, said
the Court, the state interest in compelling payment would be equally well
served by providing alternative means of satisfying the fines which would
25
not involve additional imprisonment.
(App. Div. 1969) (Conford, J.,
dissenting) ; People v. Johnson, 24 App. Div. 2d 577,
262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965) (mem.) (Hopkins, J.,dissenting in part).
20. Many default imprisonment statutes provide a daily rate for discharge of the
fine. These rates vary between $1 and $10 per day, and are commonly in the $2 to $5
range. See Appendix to Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 at 246-59 (1970). In
Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 253 N.E.2d 749 (1969), noted in 31 OHIO ST.
L.J. 342 (1970), the court held that a per diem rate of $3 was so low that it violated
equal protection:
In today's society, no one, in good conscience, can contend that a nine-dollar
fine for crashing a stop sign is deserving of 3 days in jail if one is unable to pay.
The effect of [the default imprisonment statute setting a $3 per diem rate], when
applied to the indigent, denies him equal protection and punishes him much more
severely merely because he is unable to pay.
Id. at 101-02, 253 N.E.2d at 753. See also People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 212, 261
N.Y.S.2d 970, 973 (1965) (dictum).
21. See, e.g., United States cx rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.
N.Y.), aff'd, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965), where the
court said that:
[tihose decisions making review of criminal convictions available to the indigent
have not yet been construed to compel government, State or Federal, to eradicate
from the administration of criminal justice every disadvantage caused by indigence.
239 F. Supp. at 120-21.
22. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
23. 399 U.S. at 241.
24. Id. at 241-42. In this case, as in Griffin, the Court found a law nondiscriminatory on its face but "grossly discriminatory" in its operation, since the choice of
paying a fine or serving an extended prison term was in fact an illusory choice for a
person without funds, and the result of the statute was thus to make imprisonment
beyond the statutory maximum applicable only to indigents. Id. at 242. See also
note 17 and accompanying text supra.
25. The Court also made it clear that in the event such alternatives were rejected
by any defendant, rich or poor, imprisonment for willful refusal to pay the fine would
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Although Williams established that equal protection applies to the
sentencing stage of the criminal process, the Court carefully limited its
holding and discussion to the "maximum-plus" situation. It emphasized
that its decision did not deal with the "familiar pattern of $30 or 30
days," 26 nor did it curtail judicial discretion within the statutory maximum to impose differing sentences for similar offenses. 27 Thus, it was
made apparent that Williams would not necessarily control the question
whether default imprisonment of indigents for periods less than the statutory maximum may violate equal protection, and it was to this question
that the Antazo court addressed itself.
Since the Supreme Court did not expressly indicate the equal protection test which it employed in reaching its decision in Williams, 28 the
California court was initially confronted with the task of setting forth the
equal protection test which it felt was applicable to the situation. At the
outset the court rejected what it characterized as the "traditional test"
asserted by the State, which posits that where a state law results in a
classification, such classification must merely bear some rational nexus to
a legitimate state end. 29 Rather, it was observed, the Supreme Court has
tended to employ a two-level test in reviewing legislative classifications,
generally applying the "traditional test" only in areas such as economic
regulation where judicial restraint is considered essential.30 A stricter
test, the court felt, has been applied in cases involving "suspect classifications" or touching upon "fundamental interests," and in such cases the
Supreme Court has subjected the classification to strict scrutiny, shifting
the burden to the state to establish not only that it has a compelling interest
which justifies the law but also that the distinctions created by the law 8 '
82
are necessary to further its purpose.
be permissible as always. 399 U.S. at 242 n.19. For discussion of the various existing
and proposed alternatives, see notes 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
26. 399 U.S. at 243. The "familiar pattern" is discussed at notes 66-68 and
accompanying text infra.
27. In this regard the Court explained:
The mere fact that an indigent in a particular case may be imprisoned for a
longer time than a non-indigent convicted of the same offense does not, of course,
give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Sentencing judges are
vested with wide discretion in the exceedingly difficult task of determining the
appropriate punishment in the countless variety of situations which appear. The
Constitution permits qualitative differences in meting out punishment and there
is no requirement that two persons convicted of the same offense receive identical sentences.
Id.
28. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra. However, it appears that
in Williams, the Court applied a test very similar to that announced by the AntaZo
court. See note 32 and accompanying text infra.
29. 3 Cal. 3d at 110-11, 473 P.2d at 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 261, citing McDonald
v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
30. 3 Cal. 3d at 110-11, 473 P.2d at 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 261, citing 394 U.S.
at 809; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
31. The court noted at the outset, following Griffin and Williams, that a statute
fair on its face may nevertheless result in an invidious discrimination violative of
equal protection. 3 Cal. 3d at 111-12, 473 P.2d at 1006, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
32. 3 Cal. 3d at 111, 473 P.2d at 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
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Classifications based on race and lineage have traditionally been regarded as "suspect" by the courts, and have therefore been subject to
active review under the equal protection clause.33 Interests which have
been designated so fundamental as to deserve exacting judicial inquiry
include rights in the area of criminal procedure34 and interests in voting,8 5
marriage and procreation, 6 and to some extent, education. 37 In recent
years, classifications on the basis on wealth have also begun to receive
strict scrutiny, but only, it appears, when they are associated with an invasion of some "fundamental interest."38 The Antazo court perhaps oversimplified the rule, therefore, when it stated that a "suspect classification"
or a "fundamental interest" would shift the burden of proof to the state.
It has been suggested that a more accurate approach is to view the two
factors as interrelated variables, and that courts will ordinarily look for a
"suspect classification" and a "fundamental interest" unless the classification or the interest presents a sufficiently compelling case standing alone.8 9
33. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) ; Brown v. Board of

Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
34. In addition to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), see Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
35. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316

U.S. 535 (1942).

37. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ; Brown v. Board

of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

38. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); and decisions cited supra note 34.
39. Note, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065
(1969), summarizes the Court's approach as follows:
The interaction of these two factors can be visualized by imagining two gradients.
Along the first . . . is a hierarchy of classifications, with those which are most
invidious - suspect classifications based on traits such as race - at the top.
Along the second, arranged in ascending order of importance, are interests such
as employment, education, and voting. When the classification lies at the top of
the first gradient, it will be subject to strict review even when the interest it
affects ranks low on the second gradient - for example, denial of a driver's
license on the basis of race. As the nature of the classification becomes less
invidious . . . the measure will continue to elicit strict review only as it affects
interests progressively more important. . . . Thus, restrained review might be
applied when a state disqualifies indigents by requiring a fee from all persons
desiring a driver's license or a university education, whereas strict review is
applied when indigents are disqualified from voting through a fee imposed for
the exercise of that right.
Id. at 1120-21.
Critics of this approach contend that the Court may be resurrecting substantive due process when interests which are not expressly given protection in the Constitution, nor are so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), as to be protected under due process, are selected for special
treatment under equal protection. See 82 HARV. L. REv. at 1131; Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Williams, 399 U.S. at 259. To this type of criticism, the Court
has replied:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have
restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed
to be the limits of fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
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The consequence of such an oversimplification is illustrated by the
fact that having thus stated the rule in the disjunctive, the Antazo court
concluded that strict scrutiny was justified because a classification based
on wealth had been identified.4 0 Clearly, the judicial system cannot redress every inequality resulting from economic disparities, and it is erroneous and misleading to create the impression that this is the current direction
of equal protection decisions.4 ' It is therefore submitted that instead of
ending its threshold inquiry with the determination that a suspect classification was present, the court should have expressly pointed out that the
classification in question affected an interest which has come to be regarded as fundamental - that is, the interest in criminal procedure protections as developed by Griffin and Williams - and that it was the
conjunction of those two factors which imposed the "compelling interest"
burden of proof upon the government.
The "compelling state interest" standard which appears to have
evolved following Griffin 42 involves the balancing approach rather than
the traditional inquiry into the "rationality" of a state measure.48 Under
the "compelling interest" standard a court will inquire whether the societal
benefit claimed by the state far outweighs the detriment inflicted upon
the individual. Only if the state can establish this degree of interest will
the court proceed to inquire into the constitutionality of the means chosen
to achieve the state's purpose.4 4 Following Williams, the Antazo court
assumed that the state's interests in the collection of fines and in the
rehabilitation and reformation of convicted offenders were "substantial
and legitimate," thus satisfying the "compelling state interest" aspect of
the test.45 However, the means chosen by the state to effectuate these
goals were found to be objectionable, since, in the court's view, default
imprisonment was not "necessary" to promote either state interest.
40. 3 Cal. 3d at 112, 473 P.2d at 1006, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
41. Although Justice Harlan concurred in Williams because he thought the same
result could be reached through the due process clause, he expressed his disapproval
of using broad equal protection standards to correct economic inequalities affecting
the criminal process. He said that if the equal protection implications of Williams
were carried to their logical end, for example, the state would be forced to develop
a system of individualized fines, "such that the total disutility of the entire fine, or
the marginal utility of the last dollar taken, would be the same for all individuals."
He noted, however, that despite the possibility that the Court might carry its
"rhetorical preoccupation with equalizing" to extremes, it had refrained from so doing
because of obvious practical limitations. 399 U.S. at 261.
42. See generally Note, supra note 39; Note, New Vistas in Protecting the
Indigent: Rewriting Griffin and Douglas, 4 SUFFOLK L. REv. 485 (1970).
43. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
44. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), where the Court held
that while a state law which conditions welfare eligibility upon one year's residency
in the state may have the rational purpose of restricting the movement of indigents
into the state, it serves no compelling state interest when balanced against the detriment incurred by the indigent when he effectively is forced to choose between
receiving welfare and changing his state of residence. See also Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969) ; Williams v. Rhoads, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
45. 3 Cal. 3d at 112, 473 P.2d at 1006, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
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With respect to enforcing collection of the fine the court stated that it
failed to see how either the threat or the actuality of imprisonment when
applied to a man without funds could serve the state interest in collecting
fines, since the use of imprisonment as a coercive device must necessarily
presuppose a recalcitrant offender with the ability to pay. 46 Although the
logic of this position is difficult to circumvent, it has long been avoided
by the courts, 47 presumably because of their reluctance to abandon either
48
default imprisonment itself or the traditional justification for the practice.
Perhaps, then, the explanation for the Antazo court's willingness to recognize this inconsistency is that, having determined that default imprisonment should no longer be imposed upon indigents, the court no longer
felt impelled to pay homage to its rationale.
Having concluded that, even if imprisonment of indigents could
arguably serve the state interest in collecting fines, such a method was
not "constitutionally necessary" since there were equally effective alternative procedures available, 49 the court examined the state's contention that
imprisonment served the state interest in the rehabilitation and reformation of indigent offenders. Respondents argued that imprisonment for
failure to pay a fine would impress upon an indigent offender his responsibility to society for his criminal behavior in the same manner and to
the same degree that payment of the fine by a non-indigent would promote this goal. The court was unwilling to agree that the rehabilitative
effect of imprisoning an indigent could be equated with that of fining
other offenders, but concluded that even if there were such a correspondence, because the state could also promote this latter interest through
alternative procedures the imposition of default imprisonment upon indigents was not "constitutionally permissible."'50
The court's analysis of the state interests in rehabilitation and reformation is strengthened by the fact that most commentators agree that
imprisoning indigents for nonpayment of fines tends to frustrate rather
than promote those interests. 51 In addition, ithas been pointed out by
46. 3 Cal. 3d at 114, 473 P.2d at 1007, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
47. See Note, Fines and Fining - An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1013,
1021 (1953).
48. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
49. 3 Cal. 3d at 114, 473 P.2d at 1008, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 264. See notes 71-76 and
accompanying text infra for discussion of the alternative enforcement methods.
50. 3 Cal. 3d at 115, 473 P.2d at 1008, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
51. See ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 119-21 (Approved
Draft 1968); MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954); M.
COHEN, REASON AND LAW 68 (Collier ed. 1961) ; G. PLAYFAIR & D. SINGTON, CRIME,
PUNISHMENT AND CURE 24-25, 27-28, 42, 105-06 (1965) ; S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION
254-65, 484-85 (1963) ; E.
SUTHERLAND,
PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINOLOGY 575 (4th ed. 1947) ; PILOT INSTITUTE ON SENTENCING, 26 F.R.D. 231,
380 (1959); Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 205,
221 (1964); Miller, The Fine - Price Tag or Rehabilitative Force?, 2 NAT'L
PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J. 372 (1956) ; Note, supra note 8; Note, The Equal
Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment of Fines, 64
MICH. L. REV. 938 (1966) ; Note, Equal Protection and Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines, 13 S.D.L. REV. 159 (1968); Comment, Equal Protection and the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 3

762

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

Mr. Justice Harlan that when the state by statute permits a fine as an
alternate it has, in effect, declared that it is indifferent to whether or not
the offender is imprisoned, and that all of its penological interests can
be satisfied by some punishment other than imprisonment. Having made
default
this declaration, the state cannot then insist before a court 5that
2
interests.
penological
its
serve
to
necessary
is
imprisonment
It is perhaps unfortunate that the Antaza court stated its test for
the constitutionality of the means chosen to implement state policies in
terms of necessity, 53 for although the Supreme Court has upon occasion
used such language,5 4 it gives rise to the criticism that the Court has, in
effect, usurped the legislature's legitimate authority to determine how state
interests are to be effectuated. 55 Therefore, it is suggested that instead
of requiring a standard of necessity, a more acceptable formulation of
the test would be to inquire whether reasonable, less onerous alternatives
are available which would adequately promote the compelling state interests
at stake. 56 In making such an inquiry the court would balance the detriment to the individual caused by the state procedure under attack against
the burden which the state would incur if it provided a less detrimental
alternative; and, as in the "compelling interest" stage of the inquiry, the
burden of proof would be on the state. This formulation more clearly
preserves the legislative prerogative and recognizes that the courts' proper
role is that of setting forth a broad constitutional framework within which
legislators must operate.
Use of Fines as Penalties for Criminal Offenses, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 460; Note, supra
note 47; 4 HouSTON L. REV. 695 (1967) ; 16 WAYNE L. REV. 259 (1969).
These criticisms center around the disutility of short-term imprisonment;
namely, (1) it is not long enough for effective rehabilitative programs; (2) it exposes
minor offenders to the influence of hardened criminals; (3) it severs any existing
employment and the stigma of imprisonment reduces the chances for employment upon
release; and (4) it deprives the family of whatever support the offender may have
been able to provide.
In addition to these criticisms, the default imprisonment of indigents has been
identified as one of the factors contributing to present racial tension. According to
the

REPORT OF THE

NATIONAL ADVISORY

COMMISSION

ON

CIVIL DISORDERS

(Ban-

tam 1968) :
The belief is pervasive among ghetto residents that lower courts . . . dispense
"assembly line" justice, that from arrest to sentencing, the poor and uneducated
are denied equal justice with the affluent, that procedures such as . .. fines have
been perverted to perpetuate class inequities. . . . [T]he apparatus of justice in
some areas has becomes [sic] a focus for distrust and hostility. Too often the
courts have operated to aggravate rather than relieve the tensions that ignite and
fire civil disorders.
Id. at 337.
52. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 264-65 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
53. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
54. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ; McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
55. See Note, supra note 3. See also Note, Rational Classification Problems in
Financing State and Local Government, 76 YALE L.J. 1206 (1967).
56. For instances of the application of this test, see, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) and Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
354 (1951)

(state regulation of interstate commerce).; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.

147, 162 (1939) (first amendment rights). See also Struve, The Less-RestrictiveAlternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967).
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It should be noted, however, that despite the Antazo court's careful
scrutiny of default imprisonment as a means to achieve the asserted state
interests, it does not appear that the strict test of necessity was actually
followed. In both Antazo and Williams, it was the finding that less onerous
alternatives were reasonably available which led the courts to conclude that
such alternatives must be offered to indigent defendants. 57
The practical implications of Antazo must be considered in light of
what was already established by Williams. Applying the holding of
Williams,58 it is possible to conclude, although the Court did not explicitly
so indicate, that default imprisonment may not be imposed where the substantive offense is punishable only by fine because in such a situation the
state has declared that "the outer [limit] of incarceration necessary to
satisfy its penological interests"59 is no incarceration at all. However,
Williams laid down no rule for application to the vast area between these
two extremes, i.e., where the substantive offenses are still punishable by
fine and/or imprisonment. 60
Antazo advanced the proposition that in cases where the state authorizes alternative fine or imprisonment, once the court determines the
amount of imprisonment which it considers an appropriate punishment it
may not permit additional imprisonment to be imposed simply because a
defendant is indigent."' The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the
defendant is being imprisoned as punishment for his substantive offense,
or whether his imprisonment is due solely to his indigency.
The problem of proof under such a test may pose some practical
obstacles. This was not, of course, true in Antazo, where for the same
offense and under the same sentence an affluent offender paid his fine and
was released while the indigent began to serve a jail sentence of nearly a
year. 62 However, in most cases the discrimination may not be so apparent,
for the sentencing judge still retains discretion to impose differing types
of sentences for similar offenses63 and, as at least one court has pointed
See notes 25, 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra for this aspect of the
reasoning in Williams and Antazo.
See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
399 U.S. at 242.
The Court confirmed this observation by its holding in Short v. Tate, 39
U.S.L.W. 4301 (U.S., Mar. 2, 1971), where, relying on Williams, it reversed a denial
of habeas corpus where an indigent petitioner was imprisoned for nonpayment of $425
in accumulated traffic fines. All of the offenses involved were punishable only by fines.
60. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
61. The court stated that:
[A]lthough the [sentencing] court had apparently determined that a proper
punishment for his [petitioner's] offense did not require incarceration, he was
unable to obtain his freedom only because he was poor.
-and it explained that its holding required:
[Slimply that an indigent who would pay his fine if he could, must be given an
option comparable to an offender who is not indigent.
3 Cal. 3d at 115-16, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
57.
courts'
58.
59.

62. See note 2 supra.

63. As in Williams, see note 27 and accompanying text supra, the Antazo court
affirmed that "nothing in today's opinion diminishes the wide scope of authority vested
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out,64 it would not be difficult for judges to seek to avoid the issue simply
by not imposing sentences in terms of alternative fine or imprisonment.6 5
In such cases, the petitioner will have the burden of proving that his imprisonment is due to his indigence and is not imposed because of a judicial
determination that imprisonment is the appropriate punishment. This may
be difficult to prove unless it can be shown that the court has established
a pattern of fining the affluent and imprisoning the indigent.
Although Williams expressly reserved judgment on the viability of
the familiar sentencing pattern of thirty dollars or thirty days, 66 the Antazo
court took no position on this practice. Antazo's rationale, however, is
clearly applicable to prevent its use where the offender is indigent and
would otherwise be willing to pay. In the first place, it has been forcefully argued that imprisonment for such a short duration could not possibly
serve the state interests in reformation and rehabilitation of the offender. 67
Assuming that it could, however, a showing that there are adequate and
less discriminatory alternatives to imprisonment would justify the conclusion that the thirty dollar or thirty day type of sentence fails to meet
the Antazo test, since it has the effect of imprisoning indigents because
68
of their poverty.
It might be noted that in both Williams and Antazo the equal protection clause was applied to "the state" without differentiating the functions which the legislature and the courts perform in the sentencing
process. Traditionally, however, courts have exercised a separate power
in the sentencing judge in the exercise of his powers." 3 Cal. 3d at 116, 473 P.2d at
1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
64. United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118, 119 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965).
65. Instead, estimating the financial condition of the defendants before them,
judges could fine wealthy offenders and imprison indigents, justifying their decisions
with the argument that a fine cannot effectively punish a man who knows he is unable
to pay. Such a result is clearly inconsistent with the spirit of Antazo, which requires
that unless the judge determines that imprisonment is indicated because of the nature
of the substantive offense and the past criminal record of the offender, it should not
be inflicted on any offender, rich or poor, unless he contumaciously refuses to pay his
fine. 3 Cal. 3d at 115, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
66. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
67. See authorities cited supra note 51.
68. It could be argued, however, that since the rule which the court employed in
the instant case indicates a balancing approach, the state may be able to meet its
heavy burden of proof by establishing that where the offense is of such a minor nature
that the volume of such sentences is overwhelming, administrative difficulties would
make it impossible to provide less onerous alternatives to imprisonment, see notes
73-75 infra, and that imprisonment is therefore necessary if the state interests in
punishment and deterrance are not to be seriously undermined. It must be recognized,
however, that courts have generally looked critically upon the state's asserted interest
in avoiding administrative burdens when such an interest was balanced against important individual rights, see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
Moreover, an anomalous result would obtain if an indigent could be subjected to the
evils of default imprisonment for committing a minor offense, but not for perpetrating a slightly more serious one. Apart from these objections, if the thirty dollar or
thirty day sentence should be upheld as applied to indigents, the per diem rate would
then be subject to attack for being so low as to constitute a violation of equal protection. See note 20 supra.
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to impose sanctions for contempt of their orders;69 thus, arguably an
offender who failed to pay his fine could still be sentenced to imprisonment for contempt notwithstanding Antazo. However, since the gravamen of contempt is willful, contumacious refusal to comply with the court's
order, 70 it is submitted that an indigent would have a valid defense in
that his lack of funds vitiated any choice whether or not to obey.
A final question concerns whether the alternative enforcement measures which are available 7' or which could be devised are in fact reasonable
and adequate. The courts in both Williams and Antazo assumed that they
were. 72 However, it is possible that such methods may prove to be unreasonably burdensome for the sentencing courts to administer for all in74
digent offenders, 73 or that they will not be able to be enforced effectively
and that better alternatives cannot be devised. Some might argue that a
rule of such far-reaching impact should not have been imposed when there
appears to be a significant lack of empirical data on its feasibility. 75 However, in view of the magnitude and severity of the discrimination resulting
69. See generally Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH.

U.L.Q. 1.

70. Application of McCausland, 130 Cal. App. 2d 708, 279 P.2d 820 (1955). See
also Goldfarb, supra note 69, at 2, where it is stated, "The sanction is aimed at a
resisting will."
71. The alternatives which have been suggested to date include deferred and
installment payments, see note 12 and accompanying text supra; a parole requirement
that the offender do specified work during the day, Comment, Equal Protection and
the Use of Fines as Penalties for Criminal Offenses, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 460, 465;
rehabilitative treatment or supervision by court or social agencies of those unable to satisfy the fine, or remission of the fine altogether in proper cases, id. at
466; or the less effective levy on the offender's property, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305, 310 (1966); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 485-86 (1963).
72. See 399 U.S. at 244-45 n.21 and accompanying text; 3 Cal. 3d at 114 n.13,
473 P.2d at 1008 n.13, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.13 and accompanying text.
73. See Herlihy, Sentencing the Misdemeanant, 2 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE
ASS'N J. 360 (1956):
The plan of installment fines is workable only if the court has adequate personnel
for bookkeeping and a sufficient number of probation workers trained in social
casework and skilled in helping offenders who lack the ability to cope with their
economic responsibilities.
Id. at 368. Offsetting the costs of such services, however, would be the increased collection of revenues from fines and the reduction in state expenditures for imprisonment.
74. Judge Herlihy, a municipal court judge in Delaware, found that permitting
installment payments resulted in a high rate of recidivism ("we were encouraging
irresponsibility by making it easier to pay"), so his court discontinued installment
payments although it continued to permit deferred payment in some cases. Id. at
367-68. More successful experience with installment payments was reported by Judge
Binford, a West Virginia municipal court judge, who found that even during Depression years and with inadequate probation services only five percent of those allowed
to pay by installment had to be committed. Binford, Installment Collection of Fines,
PRoc. CONG. AMER. PRISON Ass'N 361 (1937).
75. The fact that installment payments are already in use in several jurisdictions
does not indicate their effectiveness, because they are discretionary rather than mandatory. Williams and Anta.zo did not cite any studies of the results of using the
alternative methods, see note 72 supra, and in addition to the sources cited supra notes
73 & 74, the only such studies which have appeared deal with results in Great Britain
and Sweden before 1947. See Note, supra note 47. Although these reports were
favorable, they are not necessarily conclusive of what result may be expected in the
American penal system.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

37

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 3

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 16

from default imprisonment of indigents, 76 it is submitted that the court acted
properly in requiring that alternative sentencing methods be attempted.
Thus, in the instant case the California court concluded that the
reasoning of Williams should be extended to sentences which result in
imprisonment of indigents for periods less than the statutory maximum
provided for the substantive offense. The equal protection basis of
Williams provided ample authority for this extension. The court in
Antazo, however, properly decided to delineate more clearly the applicable
equal protection test, in order to provide guidance in subsequent decisions
which will apply the Antazo rationale. Although the instant decision will
involve significantly greater administrative burdens than those imposed
by Williams, such burdens should nevertheless prove to be slight in comparison with the resulting reduction in the discrimination involving critical
personal interests which is attendant to the condition of poverty.
Mary Bowen Little

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW -

CONGRESS HAS AUTHORITY UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE TO PROTECT MARINE ECOLOGY IN INTRASTATE
WATERS CORPS OF ENGINEERS TO TAKE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO ACCOUNT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NAVIGABLE
WATERS.

Zabel v. Tabb (5th Cir. 1970)
Respondents, Zabel and Russell, land developers, had applied to the
Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority for a permit
to dredge and fill 11.5 acres of Boca Ciega Bay, near St. Petersburg,
Florida, for the purpose of constructing a mobile trailer park, but the
permit was refused. The District Court of Appeals of Florida upheld the
Authority's decision' and respondents appealed to the Supreme Court of
Florida, which reversed the lower court's holding and remanded for cause. 2
76. In Williams it was noted that the greatly increased use of fines as a criminal
sanction has made nonpayment a major cause of imprisonment in this country. 399
U.S. at 240.
1. Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority, 154 So. 2d
181 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1963). The district court held that the evidence warranted
the rejection of the application on the ground that the proposed fill would produce
materially adverse effects, that the doctrine of election of remedies and estoppel did
not bar the owners from asserting the unconstitutionality of the statutes' imposing
limitations on the filling and developing of bottom land in the Bay, and that the
statutes were constitutional as applied in the instant case.
2. Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority, 171 So. 2d
376 (Fla. 1965). The Florida Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the denial of the
permission to fill amounted to a taking of property without just compensation where
it was not established that the granting of the permit would materially and adversely
affect the public interest. On remand, the district court vacated its prior judgment
and withdrew its mandate, issuing a new mandate on the judgment of the supreme
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Having obtained a permit from the county authorities, respondents next
had to obtain a similar permit from the Army Corps of Engineers, as
provided by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.3 The Corps refused to
issue the permit on the grounds that the fill would have an adverse effect
on the marine life of the area and thus disturb the delicate ecological
balance. 4 Respondents challenged the Corps' decision in the United States
5
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which reversed the
Corps' decision, stating that the Corps could consider only the effect that
the fill would have on navigation. 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Secretary of the Army
was entitled to consider ecological factors in refusing to issue a permit to
build in navigable waters. 7 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S., Feb. 23, 1971) (No. 955).
court. At the direction of the district court, the Circuit Court of Pinellas County

ordered the authority to issue a dredge and fill permit. From this order the authority
appealed. On appeal the district court held that the order of the circuit court complied with the judgment of the supreme court and the district court's mandate thereon.
Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority v. Zabel, 179 So. 2d 371
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1965).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964), provides in pertinent part:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress,
to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited;
and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of . . . except on
plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary
of the Army; it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to
alter . . . unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers....
4. A public hearing was held in St. Petersburg in November 1966, at which time
evidence was presented in support of both positions that the fill would and would not
pollute the water. On December 30, 1966, the District Engineer, Colonel Tabb, recommended to his superiors that the application be denied.
Ecology is the science of the relationships between living organisms and their
living and nonliving surroundings. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY 6 (1970). The term "ecological balance" serves to represent that these
organisms live in a necessary balance with each other.
5. Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764, 767 (M.D. Fla. 1969). The court took note
of the rule established in General Motors Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 604 (6th
Cir. 1963), which states that a court may not overrule an administrative agency upon a
question committed to agency discretion unless the agency's "findings were contrary to
law, were arbitrary or capricious, or were unsupported by substantial evidence ... "
See also Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).

The district court decided to review this case despite the fact that in 1968 the

Corps amended its regulations to read in relevant part:
The decision as to whether a permit will be issued must rest on an evaluation of
all relevant factors, including the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish
and wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general public
interest . ..
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (1) (Supp. 1970). Therefore, it is possible to infer that the
district court considered the Corps' action in amending its regulations to be an abuse
of discretion.
6. Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764, 771 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
7. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). Specifically, the court stated that:
[Nlothing in the statutory structure compels the Secretary to close his eyes to all
that others see or think they see. The establishment was entitled, if not required,
to consider ecological factors and, being persuaded by them, to deny that which
might have been granted routinely five, ten, or fifteen years ago before man's
explosive increase made all, including Congress, aware of civilization's potential
destruction from breathing its own polluted air and drinking its own infected
water and the immeasurable loss from a silent-spring-like disturbance of nature's
economy.
Id. at 201.
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Our federal form of government necessitates federal control over
navigable waters. This has traditionally been the case, for when the powers
of external sovereignty passed from Great Britain, they passed to the
colonies in their corporate capacity as the United States of America and
not to the individual colonies.8 One point of confusion which developed
concerned jurisdiction over the metamorphic land between high and low
tides. The Supreme Court, in 1842, adopted the high tide rule 9 which
appeared to establish state sovereignty' ° over tidelands, and ostensibly
the marginal sea." In 1947, however, state jurisdiction over the marginal
sea was seriously questioned in United States v. California.12 The doubts
raised by this case were partially allayed the following year when the
Supreme Court recognized the states' authority over the marginal sea
within their boundaries.' 8
8. Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 53 (1795). Without directly ruling
on the question of whether Congress has control of the navigable waters of the United
States, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), established the necessity of
providing for one central regulating authority, i.e., Congress, over interstate commerce, specifically, commerce conducted over the nation's navigable waters. In so
doing the Court assumed federal control over navigable waters. See Trelease, Arizona
v. California: Allocation of Water Resources To People, States, and Nation, 1963

SuP. CT. REV. 158, 176-83. It should be noted, however, that the states do have
limited jurisdiction over navigable waters. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367 (1842). For a determination of the area over which the states exercise jurisdiction, see United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
In relation to state control of waters, it has been said that the states hold
these lands in common trust for the public. The public trust theory does, however,
have its limitations, i.e., the "remaining use doctrine." Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 435, 452 (1892). For one state's limitation upon the "remaining use
doctrine," see State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957).

Attention is brought to the public trust theory at this point because, as will be noted
later, it may be a theory under which individuals can obtain standing to sue in
anti-pollution litigation. See note 74 infra.
For the general history regarding the genesis of submerged lands ownership,
see Rice, Estuarine Land Of North Carolina: Legal Aspect Of Ownership, Use And
Control, 46 N.C.L. REV. 779, 781-85 (1968) ; Editorial Notes, Tideland Ownership Time For Reform, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 121, 122-27 (1967).
9. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 367-68 (1842).
10. It should be noted that although the states have title to the land above the
"line of ordinary low water," United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 176 (1965),
and are able, under individual state statutes, to convey the land, they cannot convey
a fee simple title to lands beneath navigable waters, because the federal government
has an overriding interest in these lands. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
459-60 (1892).
11. The marginal or territorial sea is the water that touches upon the coast of
a nation and forms the seaward boundary of a nation. In this area the nation exercises
exclusive jurisdiction except for the right of passage given to foreign vessels. For
a detailed study of what constitutes the marginal sea, see Gross, The Maritime
Boundaries of the States, 64 MicH. L. REV. 639 (1966).
12. 332 U.S. 19, 32-35 (1947). The Court concluded that the marginal belt had
been established as an incident of federal sovereignty over the seas surrounding our
coast and that since this extension had occurred after the adoption of the Constitution
by the several states, the original states could not have derived rights in these waters
as an inherent attribute of their sovereignty.
13. In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), the Court recognized the states'
authority over marginal sea areas within their boundaries and that the California
holding was limited to instances where federal authority was in conflict with an
exercise of state jurisdiction. See Gross, supra note 11, at 641.
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In an attempt to finally resolve all controversy as to the ownership
of the tidelands and the marginal sea, Congress passed the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953,14 abrogating authority over lands underlying the
marginal sea.15 This Act, while vesting title to these lands in the states,
specifically provided that the federal government retained control over
these lands for the purposes of (1) navigation, (2) flood control, and (3)
hydroelectric power production, 16 leaving questions of further federal
7
control for future clarification.'
Prior to the Submerged Lands Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 18991 had vested partial control over navigable waters in the Army
Corps of Engineers. This delegation authorized the Corps to regulate
all construction 19 in navigable waters of the United States as it related to
navigational use. While it has been posited that the Corps is limited to
navigational considerations in administering the Act,20 there have been
14. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1964). The Submerged Lands Act and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1964), have had the effect
of dividing the submerged lands adjacent to the coast of the United States between
the federal and state governments.
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1) (1964). According to this Act, lands underlying
the marginal sea are limited to lands underlying navigable waters within the states'
boundaries. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b), illustrates the extent of these boundaries. For the
Supreme Court's determination of state marginal sea boundaries, see United States
v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
16. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(d) (1964). Certain general powers were also retained
under the Act. These powers are outlined in 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1964), which
states in relevant part:
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and
powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigational waters for the
constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs ...
17. See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127 (1967). The Court concluded
that, even after the passage of the Submerged Lands Act, the federal government
retained all of its navigational servitude and powers to regulate affected lands and
navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national
defense, and international affairs, and that nothing in the Act was to be construed
as a release or relinquishment of any rights of the United States arising under the
constitutional authority of Congress to regulate or improve navigation, or to provide
for flood control, or the production of power. In short, Congress did not abrogate
any of its control over commerce or navigation. For the extent of the control over
commerce, see United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426
(1940), where the Court stated that federal jurisdiction over navigable waters is not
limited to control for purposes of navigation only, but rather federal authority "is as
broad as the needs of commerce." For a definitive statement of Congress' power to
control commerce, see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1964).
19. This includes the construction of "any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir,
breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor,
canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States . . . ", or the excavation,
filling, alteration or modification of "the course, location, condition, or capacity of,
any port, roadstead. . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
20. See Miami Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v. Dern, 86 F.2d 135, 136 (D.C. Cir.
1936) ; 34 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 410, at 412, 415, 416 (1935) ; and 27 Op. A-r'Y GEN. 285,
288 (1909). Originally the Supreme Court interpreted the government's control over
navigable waters as limited to navigational purposes. See Weber v. Board of Harbor
Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926). However, this control was broadened by the precepts
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indications that the Corps is not so confined. 2' The Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act,2 2 as amended in 1958, seemingly allowed the Corps to
consider conservation factors in granting construction permits. The Corps
adopted this interpretation in 1968 when it specifically stated that, in the
future, ecological, environmental, and aesthetic considerations, as well as
navigational considerations, would be taken into account before any construction permits were granted.2 3 Furthermore, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,24 which specifically provides that all federal
agencies take ecological considerations into account when dealing with
activities which may possibly have an adverse effect upon man's environment,25 seems to further support this position.
The instant case represents the first judicial examination of the propriety of the Army Corps of Engineers' use of ecological factors as a
determinant in granting construction permits. To deal with this question
the Zabel court had to decide whether: (1) Congress had the power to
prohibit a project on private riparian submerged land in navigable waters,
for ecological reasons; (2) if Congress did have this power, had it relinquished it to the states; or (3) had it delegated this power to the Secretary
of the Army.
Congress has the power to regulate commerce in navigable waters of
the United States 26 when the activity to be controlled has a substantial
propounded in United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940),

where the Court stated:

In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of the
United States over its waters is limited to control for navigation ... the authority
of the United States is the Regulation of commerce on its waters. Navigability...
is but a part of this whole....
The point is that navigable waters are subject
to national planning and control in the broad regulation of commerce granted the
Federal Government.
Id. at 426-27.
21. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) ; United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423-27 (1940); United States ex rel.
Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352 (1933) ; Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v.
Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1964).
23. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (1) (Supp. 1970). For an historical interpretation of
the Corps' power under the Rivers and Harbors Act, see COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS:

How THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN

THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R. REP. No.

HELP PREVENT

917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (Supp. V, 1970).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1970). Recently there has been much legislation,

passed and proposed, in the area of environmental protection. See Farrell, Let the
Polluter Beware, 75 CASE & COM. No. 5:3 (1970), where the author states that in
the last two years there has been an astonishing amount of activity in the area of
pollution control. On the federal scene, some 500 bills and amendments were introduced in Congress and without doubt, this is the highest concentration of congressional
fire on a single issue ever experienced within such a short period of time. Several
of these laws and proposals are: The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331 (Supp. V, 1970) ; Air Quality Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. V, 1970) ;
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. V, 1970) ; Environmental
Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4371 (Supp. Sept. 1970) ; H.R. No. 13321,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; H.R. No. 4148, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See also
COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE: ACTION PROPOSALS
FOR THE 1970's, H.R. REP. No. 1082, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

26. See note 20 supra.
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economic effect on interstate commerce.27 The power to so regulate commerce applies to private riparian submerged lands in navigable waters as
well as navigable waters generally. 28 In determining that respondents'
dredging and filling operations would have a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce the court stated, "[t]hat this activity meets this
test is hardly questioned." 29 It concluded:
[T]he destruction of fish and wildlife in our estuarine waters does
have a substantial,
and in some areas a devastating, effect on inter30
state commerce.
Since the commerce clause has traditionally been employed as a catchall for a myriad of problems which were not specifically provided for by
other constitutional provisions,3 ' the maintenance of a delicate ecological
balance would seem to be readily actionable under the commerce clause
when the destruction of natural resources will have an actual effect upon
the flow of commerce.3 2 Public opinion has made it clear that there is a
growing national concern that something must be done to preserve the
ecological balance.88 The Zabel decision may be construed as a constructive step in ecological preservation, for it provides a rationale upon which
34
future judicial action may be predicated.
Federal power to regulate the filling of the Bay having been established, it was next necessary for the court to determine if Congress surrendered this responsibility to the states under the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953.3 5 For the purposes of this case, however, the examination
27. Wickard v. Filburn. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Court stated:

[I]f appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce,
it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect
is what might at some earlier time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."
Id. at 125.
28. See 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1964); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121,
127 (1967).
29. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970).
30. Id. at 204.
31. For a recent example of how relatively insignificant the nexus has to be
between the activity sought to be regulated and interstate commerce, thus providing
a basis for the invocation of commerce clause power, see Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298
(1969), noted in 15 VILL. L. REV. 466 (1970).
32. Studies conducted by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries show that in
Florida there is a resource loss of $600 per year for each acre of disturbed (dredged)
submerged land. ENVIR. REP. - FED. LAWS 51:4201 (1970). This affects interstate
commerce in that fewer seafoods are available for sale out of state.
33. See Environment: Fighting to Save the Earth from Man, 95 TIME, Feb. 2,
1970, at 56; Pollution: Growing Menace - What U.S. Is Doing About It,66 U.S.
NEws, June 9, 1969, at 40.
34. The commerce power has previously been used to abate air and water pollution. See United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968),
aff'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); Edelman,
Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power To Abate
Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1067 (1965).
35. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964). For the legislative history of the Act, see
S. REP. No. 133 and H.R. REP. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) ; 1953 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1385-1640.
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was limited to the possible surrender of authority over the tidelands.
Respondents argued that under the Act, Congress retained only the power
to regulate for purposes of (1) navigation, (2) flood control, and (3)
hydroelectric power.3 6 The court rejected this contention, noting that it
totally ignored the legislative history of the Act 37 as well as specific
language to the contrary found within the Act itself. Section 1314(a)
of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights
in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable
waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation,
national defense, and international affairs .... *3
The court concluded that this
pretation of the Act,3 9 firmly
of navigable waters, including
whenever the activity related

language, coupled with prior judicial interestablished that Congress retained control
those waters to which the states have title,
thereto creates any colorable effect upon

commerce.

Having established that Congress had the power to regulate commerce for environmental reasons and that it had not abrogated this power,
the Zabel court next determined how Congress had effectuated the exercise of this power. The court reasoned that in the instant case the instrument of congressional regulation was the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899.40 As previously noted, 4 1 this Act is administered by the Army

Corps of Engineers and thus, casts the Corps in a role analogous to an
administrative agency acting within the parameters of a delegation of
authority. In seeking to define the scope of this delegation, the court
concentrated its examination on prior case law with a focus toward determining whether the Corps had authority to refuse to issue construction
permits upon ecological considerations. In arriving at the conclusion that
the Corps did have such authority, the court reasoned that although the
Corps' considerations had previously been confined to the effect of the
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(d) (1964).

37. The controversy which culminated in the Submerged Lands Act and the
Outer Continental Shelf Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964), was primarily concerned with
who would receive the royalties from the development of oil and gas resources. The
states feared the federal government would claim control as an adjunct to the newly
declared "paramount rights" doctrine. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804, 805
(1947). The new legislation was meant to allay these fears, for in effect it divided
the "ownership" of the resources between the state and federal governments. The
states became the "owners" of the resources of the tidelands and were to receive the
benefits from them. The federal government, however, was given exclusive ownership
vis-a-vis the states to the outer continental shelf. See Note, The Seaward Extension
Of States: A Boundary For New Jersey Under The Submerged Lands Act, 40 TEMP.
L.Q. 66 (1966).

38. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1964).

39. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127 (1967). The Court essentially
held that the United States retained all of its navigational servitude and powers to
regulate commerce in the lands within the states' borders and navigable waters and
that nothing in the Act was to be construed as a relinquishment of Congress' control
over commerce.
40. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 207 (5th Cir. 1970).
41. See p. 769 supra.
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construction upon navigation, 42 the Rivers and Harbors Act did not
preclude the Corps from using other determinative criteria. 43 This permissive interpretation of the Act is not without precedent. Although most
cases under the Act had been limited to navigational problems, 44 a possible
exception is found in United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern,45 where
the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Army had authority
to deny a permit for the construction of a wharf even though it would not
interfere with navigation.4 0 The significance of the Greathouse decision
lies in the Court's recognition that the Corps did not have to wear "navigational blinders" when it considered a permit request.4 7 In 1960, the
Supreme Court further expanded the scope of the Rivers and Harbors
Act in United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,4s where it ruled that the
Act provided the proper vehicle for controlling discharge of industrial
waste into navigable streams. To reach this conclusion the Court reasoned
that the Act should be read "charitably" in light of the necessity to preserve the beauty and use of our national waterways.4 9 Similarly, the
42. See, e.g., cases cited in note 20 supra.
43. An equally plausible interpretation of the statute was presented by the district
court. That court gave the Act a literal interpretation, viewing it as vesting discretionary authority in the Corps solely in regard to the navigable capacity of the water.
Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764, 767 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960);

Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929) ; Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266

U.S. 405 (1925).
45. 289 U.S. 352 (1933).

46. The reason for the denial was that the United States had plans to condemn
petitioner's land for use as a means of access to a proposed parkway. Allowing a
wharf to be built would increase the expense to the government since it would increase the market value of the land and would require the government to pay for
tearing down the wharf as well. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 208 (5th Cir. 1970).
The district court concluded, however, that Greathouse was not determinative
because in Greathouse the Supreme Court was not considering the issue of whether
or not the Corps had discretionary authority to consider other than navigational
factors. Rather the Court was ruling as to whether or not petitioners had a right to
a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of War to issue a permit for the
construction of a wharf, it having been determined that the wharf would not interfere with navigation. The Secretary of War was able to take note of other factors
not because this was within his discretionary powers, but because the rights of the
petitioner were subordinate to the right of the United States to use the property.
Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764, 771 (1969).
47. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 208 (5th Cir. 1970).
48. 362 U.S. 482 (1960). In Republic Steel, the United States sought an injunction against several companies to: (1) stop them from depositing industrial solids in
a navigable river without first obtaining a permit from the Corps; and (2) compel
the companies to restore the channel to its former depth. The Court held that industrial deposits placed in the river in question by the companies reduced the depth of
the channel substantially and created an "obstruction" within the meaning of the
Rivers and Harbors Act.
49. The language employed by the Court in Republic Steel was as follows:
We read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be served. The
philosophy of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in State of New Jersey v.
State of New York . . . that "A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure,"
forbids a narrow, cramped reading of either § 13 or of § 10.
362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960). But Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter,
Whittaker and Stewart in dissent, stated:
However appealing the attempt to make this old piece of legislation fit
modern-day conditions may be, such a course is not a permissible one for a court
of law, whose function it is to take a statute as it finds it.
Id. at 510.
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decision rendered by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Citizens Committee For the Hudson Valley v.
Volpe, 50 which criticized the Corps for its failure to follow statutory procedure, 5 went one step beyond the holdings of Greathouse and Republic
Steel. Whereas the latter cases recognized that the Corps did not have
to limit its considerations to the effect upon navigation, the Volpe court
52
held that the Corps has a duty to weigh other than navigational factors.
In outlining the parameters of limitation upon the Corps' exercise of
discretion in granting construction permits, it is submitted that the Zabel
court's interpretation of the Rivers and Harbors Act in conjunction with
the aforementioned cases should not be construed to mean more than a
recognition that the Corps must be cognizant of problems which arise
ancillary to its primary function - i.e., the granting of construction permits on navigable waters. This position seems supported by the court's
statement that the examination of these cases in order to verify the Corps'
taking note of non-navigational considerations is somewhat circuitous in
light of other federal legislation which clearly illustrates a congressional
intent that environmental factors should be generally considered by all
federal agencies.5 3
Although the court believed that the case law interpreting the Corps'
scope of authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act was sufficient to
support its conclusion that the Corps was acting within its discretion in
denying a construction permit for ecological reasons, its explication of
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act 4 and the National Environmental
Policy Act 55 seemed to require it to find that the Corps was compelled
to evaluate non-navigational considerations in deciding upon a permit
application. The court's interpretation that the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act requires dredging and filling agencies, whether public or private,
and the Corps of Engineers to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service
for the purpose of conserving wildlife resources 0 seems totally consistent
50. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964), requires congressional approval for the construction
of a dike or causeway. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g) (Supp. V, 1970), requires the approval
of the Secretary of Transportation when construction of a bridge is contemplated.
The district court criticized the Corps for issuing a permit to construct a dike or
causeway without first obtaining the approval of Congress and the Secretary of
Transportation. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083,
1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97, 106 (2d.Cir. 1970).
52. The Zabel court stated that what Volpe essentially held was that because
the expressway project in question also required the approval of the Secretary of
Transportation, who is statutorily required to consider conservation before granting
a permit, i.e., 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (Supp. V, 1970), environmental protection purposes could only have been served if the Corps had taken upon itself the consideration of the fill project in the context of the entire development of which it was a
part, rather than having limited its consideration solely to the effect of the project
on navigation. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 208 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 209 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1964).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (Supp. V, 1969).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1964). The court stated that if there was any doubt
that the statute directs the Corps to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service it can
be quickly dispelled, for it would be incongruous for Congress, in light of the fact
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with the provision of the Act referred to by the court, which states that
whenever any body of water is to be controlled or modified for any purpose whatever by any federal agency or any public or private agency
under federal permit, such agency is to consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service.57 While this interpretation of the Act is without precedent it
does seem to follow when the provision is viewed out of context. However, when examined in conjunction with other provisions of the Act, it
is misleading and makes the court's interpretation seem somewhat strained.
The procedures that the federal agencies are to follow apply to waterresource development projects,5 8 not private land development activities,
and the cases that have ruled on the implementation of the Act's procedure have seemingly been limited to such projects.Y9 Moreover, the
Act does not provide that the agency involved should revoke a permit (or
refuse to give one) or cease its own environmental damaging activities.
It merely provides that the recommendations propounded by conservation
agencies "should be adopted to obtain maximum overall project benefits" 60
and that the project plans should be modified to conform to conservational
needs to the extent that the burden does not outweigh, in the agency's
judgment, the benefit. 6 '
Perhaps the court's interpretation of this Act is more clearly understood when it is considered in light of the more pervasive impetus toward
a national environmental protection policy which the court found reflected
in the National Environmental Policy Act - the Magna Charta of the
environmental protection movement. This Act essentially states that every
federal agency shall consider ecological factors when dealing with activities which may have an adverse impact on man's environment. 62 The
breadth of its language seems to clearly bring the Corps within its scope.
Section 4332 of the Act provides in pertinent part that:
that it intends conservation to be considered in private dredge and fill operations, not

to direct the only federal agency concerned with licensing such projects both to
consult and to take such factors into account. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 209
(5th Cir. 1970).

It should be noted, however, that the district court presented a strong argu-

ment in reversing the Corps' refusal to grant appellees a permit based on the language
employed in the 1958 Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 662(a), (b), and (h) (1964), and the Senate
Report accompanying it, S. REP. No. 1981, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 1958 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3451. Quoting from the report, the district court stated:
The legislation would be a permissive law so far as it concerns relationship
between water project construction agencies and fish and wildlife conservation
agencies. The latter would not be given any veto power over any part of the
water resources development program.
Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764, 769 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 662 (a) (1964).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 661; § 662(b) (1964).
59. See Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) ; State of Iowa v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 178 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 979
(1950); United States v. 1,972.27 Acres of Land, 297 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Okla.
1969) ; Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 662(b) (1964).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 662(c) (1964).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1970).
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[T]o the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, . . .63
It is submitted that this expression of congressional intent is broad enough
to lend credence to the Zabel court's declaration that the action of the
Corps in denying a permit was not only permissible, but actually required.
Moreover, although the National Environmental Policy Act has been held
not to be retroactive, 4 there does not seem to be any logical reason why
the Corps could not implement the policy considerations expressed by
the Act in its adherence to existing statutory norms, i.e., the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act.
Two additional contentions of the respondents were treated summarily by the court: (1) that the denial of a permit without a hearing
before the Fish and Wildlife Service was a deprivation of property without due process of law; and (2) that their private submerged property
was taken for public use without just compensation. 65 In answer to the
first contention the court held that respondents were not entitled to a
hearing before the Fish and Wildlife Service because it was not the agency
directly concerned with the determination of the permit request.6 6 The
respondents' contention that the denial of the permit constituted an illegal
"taking" without compensation was also rejected by the court. This decision was based on the principle that there was no taking because the
waters and underlying lands are subject to the paramount navigational
67
servitude in the federal government.
63. Id.
64. Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, 248 (M.D.
Pa. 1970). In Bartlett, the court held that the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 would not bar the Secretary of Transportation from granting federal funds for a
state secondary road construction project that antedated and did not comply with the
Act, since the Act is not retroactive. However, the Zabel court took a different
view, stating:
Although this Congressional command was not in existence at the time the
permit in question was denied, the correctness of that decision must be determined
by the applicable standards of today.
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 213 (5th Cir. 1970).
65. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1970).
66. It should be noted, however, that respondents were given a hearing before
the Corps. Id. at 202. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1935) ; see
also 52 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1939), for an explanation of the policies underlying
administrative procedural decisions, specifically with reference to Morgan.
67. Basically, this doctrine provides that the federal government may exercise its
powers to control that which effects navigation and need not compensate for private
property interests which may be impaired by the government's actions. This has been
an absolute doctrine whereby states or individuals, acting under state authority or
acquiescence, are precluded from interfering with federal actions. See United States
v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93
U.S. 4 (1876). The rationale that allows governmental "taking" under this doctrine
is that there is no damage within the meaning of the fifth amendment because the
taking was merely the lawful exercise of a power to which the property had always
been subject. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
In the past this doctrine has been limited to federal taking for purposes beneficial to
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While the Zabel court has expounded the scope of authority running
to the Corps of Engineers to provide a legal basis for the consideration
of ecological factors in its decision making, it is submitted that this decision
should not be construed to be a judicial recognition that the Corps has
plenary power to make discretionary determinations with regard to matters
of conservation, but rather that the Corps' primary role in the area of
environmental protection is that of an active enforcement tool, weighing
and deciding upon information supplied to it by other agencies. 68 The
Corps does not as yet have the requisite expertise to evaluate the complex problems of conservation.69 It is submitted, however, that the Corps
is required to7 0 and should investigate possible ecological harm, and, in
navigation even though such benefit is not the exclusive or even the major purpose
of the project. See United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
In the instant case, it has been seen that if there was a taking, it was not for
the benefit of navigation. It is submitted that public interest in environmental preservation is sufficient to allow a valid extension of the navigational servitude doctrine to

include a taking without compensation for its benefit. Such an extension is not completely without precedent. Several state courts have held that an exercise of the state
navigation power may be accompanied by a prerogative of no compensation. See, e.g.,
Beidler v. Sanitary Dist., 211 Ill. 628, 71 N.E. 1118 (1904); Natcher v. Bowling
Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936) ; Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement
Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961) ; State ex rel. Anderson v. Masheter,
1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964). The Supreme Court of California, in
Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968), allowed the state to invoke its privilege of no compensation in conjunction with a project which did not benefit navigation. Perhaps if private
interests are aware that they may be precluded from using their lands, without compensation, if they do not take steps to preserve the balance of nature, industry will be
much more cognizant of ecological factors in their normal business operations.
For an analysis questioning the soundness of employing the no compensation
rule for purposes not connected with navigation, see 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1116,
1122-23 (1968). For a general criticism of the navigational servitude doctrine, see
Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule
of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1963) ; Comment, Constitutional Law Eminent Domain - Condemnation of Riparian Lands Under The Commerce Power,
55 MICH. L. REV. 272 (1956).
68.

COUNCIL ON

ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY,

ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY:

THE

FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 178, 189 (1970).
69. This factor was noted by the district court. Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764,
769 (M.D. Fla. 1969). See also COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S
ESTUARIES: THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AND DELTA, H.R. REP. No. 1433, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 16, 33, 39, 41, 71 (1970), where it was stated that the Corps is not as yet
fully responding to national environmental policies and implied that the Corps does
not have the requisite expertise to make important environmental protection decisions
of its own.
It is interesting to note that approximately one month after appellees instituted
the suit against the Corps, the Secretary of the Army signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Secretary of the Interior binding the Corps to an agreement
by which it would consult with interested state and federal parties before issuing a
permit for construction in navigable waters, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (Supp. 1970). This
agreement left the final determination of the permit issuance to the Secretary of the
Army, even though he was not the one with the conservation expertise. It is posited
that this was the logical solution to a complex problem for it was necessary for someone to make an evaluation of the many reports that the Corps would receive in regards
to conservation and the Corps, as the agency which finally issues the permits, was
the logical one to make the determination upon receiving the various information.
70. See COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How THE
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R.
REP. No. 917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ; Interim Guidelines For Federal Agencies
Under The National Environmental Policy Act, ENVIR. REP. - FED. LAWS 71:0301
(1970).
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conjunction with other governmental agencies who do possess the requisite
expertise,7 1 use these findings of possible ecological detriment in the
evaluation of permit applications.
The Zabel decision is an important innovation in the struggle to preserve the environment of the coastal zone. 72 Although Congress has passed
or is currently considering many bills 7 3 which focus upon environmental
preservation, there is, regrettably, a paucity of enforcement procedures.7 4
The instant case provides, for the first time, a method by which potential
pollution problems can be effectively controlled before they materialize. 75
This may be the only rational solution to the pollution problem. The
present practice of relying on abatement proceedings to halt pollution
once it has occurred is not a satisfactory method of environmental pollution control. However, it should be recognized that the present decision
is not a panacea for environmental ills. It provides, at best, a stop-gap
solution which can only yield sporatic protection for the valuable coastal
zone and other areas within the Corps' jurisdiction. A long term solu71. See Executive Order No. 11507, 35 FED. REG. 2573 (1970 ; Interim Guidelines For Federal Agencies Under The National Environmental Policy Act, ENvIR.
REP. - FED. LAws 71:0301, at 0303 (1970) ; ENVIR. REP. - FED. LAWS 51:4141, at
4148; 4361, at 4362 (1970). A specific example of how other agencies are better able
to cope with the problem appears in a report prepared by the Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, Department of the Interior, ENviR. REP. - FED. LAWS 51:4201 (1970),
which states, in pertinent part:
Coastal and Offshore Research: The Bureau operates 13 major biological laboratories, and several field stations and other activities in coastal and offshore
research.
Increased emphasis on preservation and maintenance of estuaries and coastal
areas from adverse effects of pollution, dredging and filling, industrialization and
urbanization, will require more precise information on the effects of fish and
shellfish.
Special research will include studies of typical food chains in representative
estuaries....
Id.
REP,

72. See Ludwigson, Managing The Environment In The Coastal Zone, 1 ENVIR.
CURR. DEV., Monograph No. 3, at 1-2 (1970). The author states:
The coastal zone, because of its physical biological and chemical nature, is
naturally an area of heightened environmental concern.
Geographically, the coastal zone is not strictly defined, but includes all shore
touching on tidal water, the coastal sea and sea floors out at least to the limits
of U.S. jurisdiction (3 miles or a depth of 600 feet), estuaries, bays, and inlets,
coastal marsh lands, and the lands within several miles of tidal waters (the latter
depending, for practical purposes, more on legal than geographical criteria).
Biologically, this is the most productive of all land or water areas on earth.
Seven of the 10 most valuable species in American commercial fisheries spend
all or important periods of their lives in estuarine waters. At least 80 other
commercially important fish species are dependent on estuaries.

73. See note 25 supra.
74. Presently the principal method of enforcement of environmental policies and
laws is by means of abatement actions which are in part provided for by the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 466(g) (Supp. V, 1970). See note 34
supra. See also discussion in notes 8 & 67 supra, which suggest that there are other
means by which private individuals and the Government may abate pollution.

75. See recommendations in COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S
ESTUARIES: THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AND DELTA, H.R. REP. No. 1433, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss4/3

50

Editors: Recent Developments
APRIL

1971]

779

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

tion is necessary not only for environmental control in areas contiguous
to navigable waters but elsewhere as well. 76
Thomas B. Erekson

LANDLORD-TENANT CARE

TO

LANDLORD HELD TO A DUTY OF REASONABLE

PROTECT TENANTS

COMMITTED

By THIRD

FROM

FORESEEABLE

CRIMINAL ACTS

PARTIES IN THE COMMON AREAS

OF AN

APARTMENT BUILDING.

Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp.
(D.C. Cir. 1970)
Appellant Kline entered into a lease agreement with appellee landlord
in 1959 for an apartment in Washington, D.C. At that time, the apartment building had internal security arrangements whereby the main entrance and lobby received twenty-four hour supervision and two side
entrances were either attended or locked in the evenings.' By mid-1966,
while the crime rate in the area had risen considerably, these services had
deteriorated to an extent that the main entrance was seldom supervised
and the alternate entrances were left open and unguarded. On November
17, 1966, appellant was seriously injured in a common hallway of her
76. To this end, President Nixon proposed the establishment of an independent
Environmental Protection Agency, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 6 WEEKLY
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 908, 917 (1970), which proposal became
effective on December 2, 1970, and coincided with the Senate's confirmation of William
D. Ruckelshaus as the Agency's head, I ENVIR. REP. - CURR. DEv. 811, 813 (1970).
See Id. 831, 859-61, for a detailed view of the organization plan for the Environmental
Protection Agency. Although this proposal is a step in the right direction in seeking
to alleviate much of the present confusion caused by the myriad of federal agencies
now involved in the environmental protection controversy, it by no means provides
any effecitve solution to conservation problems, primarily because it notably lacks
sufficient enforcement procedures.
Recently a proposal was presented to Congress, Recommendations - The
Proposed Program From The National Estuarine Pollution Study, 1 ENVIR. REP. CURR. DEv., Monograph No. 3, at 12-20 (1970), which, generally, suggests a program
recognizing the primary responsibility of the states in a management program for
their estuarine and coastal areas, and on the federal side provides for the coordination
of federal activities in these areas and for assistance to the states in their management
activities. It is submitted that it is legislation such as this that is necessary not only
in regard to the coastal zone but in all areas. The proposal not only suggests what
has to be done, it specifies what legislation is needed to accomplish its objectives.
For a comprehensive examination of the problems associated with water
pollution control refer to J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY (1968).
1. At trial, appellant testified that the impressive security precautions were a
major factor in her decision to rent from appellee. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue Apartment Corp., __ F.2d __ (D.C. Cir. 1970). at ___ n.1.
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apartment building when she was criminally assaulted and robbed by an
unknown assailant. Subsequently, she initiated a civil suit against the
landlord, alleging that he had breached a duty owed to appellant in that
he had failed to provide adequate security measures for his tenants. The
district court found as a matter of law that the landlord had no duty to
provide such security. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed, holding that a landlord with notice of crimes within
the common hallways of his building is obligated to exercise reasonable
care to protect his tenants from "foreseeable" criminal acts 2 committed
by third parties in said areas and that appellee in the instant case had
failed to meet this duty insofar as the standard of care required of the
landlord had not been met. 3 Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation- .....
- F.2d ----(D.C. Cir. 1970).
The common law duties of a landlord are centered upon two district
areas of responsibility: (1) those relating to the leased premises themselves ;4 and (2) those arising from the existence of areas not demised
which are reserved for the common use of all tenants and are under the
landlord's exclusive control. By virtue of his retention of exclusive control
over undemised areas, the landlord bears the responsibilities of a general
owner of property.5 As an owner, the landlord does not, in the absence
of a covenant, act as the tenant's insurer," but rather is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care in keeping the common areas in a safe condition. 7
This obligation, under various circumstances, has required the landlord to
2. The court noted that these acts were foreseeable "in the sense that they

were probable and predictable." Id. at ...........

3. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp-.
...... F.2d (D.C. Cir.
1970). The court concluded that "reasonable care under all the circumstances" (the
standard applied in this situation) required the landlord to maintain the "same relative
degree of security" as that experienced at the outset of appellant's tenancy. Id. at ---------

See text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
4. The duties of both parties to a lease are, for the most part, included in the
lease agreement. These duties, generally collateral to the scope of this discussion,
are the modern manifestations of the common law agrarian tenancy where the transaction was a conveyance of an estate in land. Of prime concern was the landlord's
reversionary interest in the property where eventually, with the doctrine of waste and
the increased length of tenancies, the tenant became obligated to make repairs and was
liable to eviction and damages if he failed to do so. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 122-23 (6th ed. 1934), cited in Javins v. First National Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Today, however, the tenant does
not have any great concern about whether he has an estate in land. He is primarily
interested in the services of shelter and comfort.
5. Looney v. McLean, 129 Mass. 33 (1880); Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J.
267, 104 A.2d 689 (1954) ; Gilloon v. Reilly, 50 N.J.L. 26, 11 A. 481 (1887) ; Baldwin
v. McEldowney, 324 Pa. 399, 188 A. 154 (1936) ; Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super.
481, 205 A.2d 680 (1964).
6. See Harrison v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 58 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ; Winthrop
v. 1600 16th St. Corp., 208 A.2d 624 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965) ; Pepper v. Schmidlin, 266
App. Div. 824, 42 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1943), appeal dismissed, 291 N.Y. 668, 51 N.E.2d
938 (1943) ; Flora v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 330 Pa. 166, 198 A. 663

(1938); 1

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

341 (A. Casner ed. 1952).

7. Levine v. Katz, 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Mayer v. Housing Authority,
84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 44 N.J. 567,
210 A.2d 617 (1965) ; Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 205 A.2d 680 (1964).
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keep his hallways properly lighted,8 to maintain bannisters 9 and elevators, 10
to keep common areas free from rodents or animals" and to clear walks
12
of snow and ice.
In order to determine whether a landlord's duty of reasonable care
encompasses protection from the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties,
it is necessary to examine the various bases upon which such a duty might
be predicated. Traditionally, recovery under the "exclusive control" theory
has been limited to damages resulting from unsafe physical conditions
caused by a failure of the landlord to exercise reasonable care in keeping
the "common" areas in a safe condition.' In addition, an individual ordinarily has no duty to act affirmatively to prevent injury to another caused
by a third party,' 4 nor any obligation to anticipate third party criminal
activity 5 unless some relationship exists between the parties imposing
such an obligation.' 6 When such a relationship does exist, liability is
ordinarily based on the fact that the ability of one of the parties to protect
himself has been somewhat limited by his submission to the control of
the other. As a result, the party possessing the superior control is accordingly burdened with a duty of exercising reasonable care to protect the
subservient party. Thus, liability of the dominant party has been found
in relationships such as employer-employee, 17 business proprietor-patron,"8
8. Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ; Beitch v. Mishkin, 184 Pa.
Super. 120, 132 A.2d 703 (1957).
9. Loveless v. Warner, 37 Ill. App. 2d 204, 185 N.E.2d 392 (1962) ; Seidenberg
v. Jeneroff, 249 App. Div. 685, 291 N.Y.S. 235 (1936), aff'd per curiarn, 273 N.Y. 624,
7 N.E.2d 726 (1937).
10. Guensch v. Trustees of Third Presbyterian Congregation, 109 N.J.L. 78,
160 A. 507 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932). Illinois extends this duty to the higher standard
of care of a common carrier. See Koenig v. 399 Corporation, 97 Ill. App. 2d 345,
240 N.E.2d 164 (1968).
11. Maryland v. Manor Realty Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1949)
(liability imposed when tenant bitten by rat) ; Siegel v. 1536-46 St. John's Place
Corp., 184 Misc. 1053, 57 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945) (landlord liable when
tenant bitten by dog).
12. Robinson v. Park Central Apartments, 248 F. Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1965)
Skupienski v. Maly, 27 N.J. 240, 142 A.2d 220 (1958). For an analysis of additional
landlord common-area responsibilities, see generally 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
ff 234[21[b], at 334 (1968) ; 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 109, at 169 (3d ed.
1939) [hereinafter cited as

TIFFANY].

13. See note 8-12 supra. For an argument that the "exclusive control" theory
should continue to be limited to dangerous physical conditions, see 20 RUTGERS L.
REV. 140, at 143 (1965).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) ; Bohlen, The Moral Duty
to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908).
15. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 33, at 176-79 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
16. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 448, 449 (1965), establishes a duty
to guard against unilaterally created situations from which third party crimes or
intentional acts will foreseeably occur. A clear application of this rule involves the
case where an owner leaving his key in the ignition while parked in a known highcrime neighborhood is held liable for injuries caused by the theft of his vehicle. See
Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964). Similarly,
in Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955), a bulldozer owner was
liable for injuries caused by unauthorized operators of the equipment because the
bulldozer had been left unlocked overnight near a canyon edge.
17. Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947); Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 132
N.J.L. 331, 40 A.2d 562 (1945).
18. Williams v. Essex Amusement Corp., 133 N.J.L. 218, 43 A.2d 828 (1945);
Connelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37 A.2d 125 (1944).
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landowner-invitee,' 9 school district-pupil,2 0 carrier-passenger, 2' and inn22
keeper-guest.
The question whether the landlord-tenant relationship imposes a duty
upon the landlord to provide tenants with reasonable security from predictable crimes has received little judicial inquiry. The few decisions
confronting this question have usually absolved the landlord from responsibility on various bases. In many instances the major drawback to
obtaining relief has been the failure to establish proximate causation
23
between the landlord's alleged breach of duty and the tenant's injury.
Additionally, courts have denied relief by requiring either a contractual
recital of the duty2 4 or statutory authorization for such protection.2 5
Perhaps the overriding reason for the courts' refusal to impose liability
is that the landlord-tenant relationship is tied to property law concepts
which negate the idea of the relationship itself creating a duty between
the parties. Under traditional principles of property law, a lease is not
thought of as creating a relationship wherein one party becomes subservient to the other, but rather is considered as a single transaction in
which one party conveys an estate in land to another for a specified term.
However, this rationale becomes untenable in the modern multiple-dwelling
context where a continuing relationship is a necessity due to the tenant's
continuing need for services and the landlord's exclusive control in providing them.
These aspects of the modern landlord-tenant relationship were recognized by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Javins v. First
19. Harry Poretsky & Sons, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 235 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1956). The
landowner-invitee relationship provides the rationale for liability in several specific
relationships. See generally PROSSER, note 15 supra, at § 61.
20. Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist., 40 Cal. 2d 207, 253 P.2d 1
(1953) ; McLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953).
21. Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968); Dayen v. Penn Bus Co., 363 Pa. 176, 69 A.2d 151 (1949).
While the carrier-passenger relationship is often said to impose a high standard of
care, a more accurate statement is that the carrier's duty is related to the degree of
control held over the passenger. Thus, in Neering v. Illinois Central R.R., 383
Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943), the defendant carrier was held to a standard of
"ordinary" care since the injured plaintiff was not in a train but rather in a station.
22. Coca v. Arceo, 71 N.M. 186, 376 P.2d 970 (1962) ; McFadden v. Bancroft
Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 56, 46 N.E.2d 573 (1943).
23. Appelbaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Goldberg v. Housing
Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962) ; McCappin v. Park Capitol Corp., 42
N.J. Super. 169, 126 A.2d 51 (App. Div. 1956) ; DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty
Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Civ. Ct. of N.Y.C. 1965) ; DeFoe v. Sloane,
99 A.2d 846 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953). It has been argued that disposing of a case
purely on this ground is premature since the initial questions of negligence establishment of duty and breach of duty - remain unresolved. See 48 N.C.L. REV.
713, 715 (1970). See generally Note, Proximate Cause - Negligence - Liability of
Original Tortfeasor for Injury Caused by Intervening Criminal Act, 24 MINN. L.
REV. 666, 679 (1940) ; PROSSER, note 15 supra, at § 49.
24. DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463
(Civ. Ct. of N.Y.C. 1965).
25. Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). Compare
Goldberg with Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup.
Ct. 1969). In Bass, defendant's apartment complex was authorized by statute to maintain a private police force if it elected to do so. Defendant was held liable for not
providing adequate police protection once the election had been made. See 74 Dicx.
L. Rzv. 543 (1970).
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National Realty Corp.26 where a warranty of habitability was implied to
exist in a lease. In requiring the landlord to maintain the leased premises
in a reasonable condition throughout the term of the lease, the Javins
court by imposing a duty upon the landlord to provide continuing repair
services, recognized his superior ability to do so. A similar rationale
had been applied by the same circuit in Kendall v. Gore Properties,Inc.,2 7
where a landlord was held civilly liable for the murder of a tenant by one
of the landlord's employees because the landlord was deemed to have exclusive control over the employee's contacts with the tenants and had failed
to exercise reasonable care in his selection. 28 In Ramsey v. Morrisette,29
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment
in favor of the landlord on facts indistinguishable from those in the instant case. Relying on Kendall, the Ramsey court made it clear that the
existence of independent third-party criminal activity would not preclude
a cause of action based in tort, provided that particular conduct and circumstances existed which indicated a failure on the part of the landlord
to exercise reasonable care.30 While consideration of these developments
tends to make the instant decision appear as having been foreshadowed
and thus merely a logical sequel to them, the court's application of these
trends is significant and deserves further amplification.
In holding that a landlord is under a duty of reasonable care to
protect tenants from predictable crime in the common areas, the Kline
court relied on three distinct but complementary lines of reasoning to
support its findings. This triad consists of: (1) considerations involving
the "logic of the situation" ;81 (2) an analysis of the effect of implied
contractual obligations upon the landlord;32 and (3) an examination of
both the duty imposed and the standard of care required in analogous
relationships such as innkeeper-guest. 3 3 Before analyzing the propriety
26. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 383 (1970).

27. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Compare Kendall with Argonne Apartment
House C6. v. Garrison, 42 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1930). In Argonne, defendant employer required and received references from his employee, although these were not
authenticated. The court concluded that the employer was not negligent in selecting
his employee. In Kendall, however, no inquiries were made concerning the employee's
fitness for employment.
28. This "exclusive control" theory has been applied in many situations involving
third party actions. See Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d
439 (App. Div. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 44 N.J. 567, 210 A.2d 617 (1965), noted in
20 RUTGERS L. REV. 140 (1965) (child struck by rock thrown by unknown third
party; defendant Housing Authority held liable). Similarly, liability was found in
Harper v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 104 Cal. App. 2d 621, 232 P.2d 262 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1951) and Hieken v. Eichhorn, 159 S.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. Mo. 1942)
(tenants injured in play area by vehicles driven by third parties with landlord's tacit
consent) ; Geigel v. New York City Housing Authority, 225 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup.
Ct. 1962), aff'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 838, 233 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1962) (child injured after
defendant failed to remove a baseball diamond painted by children in a busy area);
Da Rocha v. New York City Housing Authority, 109 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd, 282 App. Div. 728, 122 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1953) (child injured by playmates when
landlord activated a water spray in a crowded play area).
29. 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969), noted in 48 N.C.L. REV. 713 (1970).
30. Id. at 512.
31..
F.2d at ......
32. Id. at
33. Id. at
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and effect of the court's reasoning on each of these points, it is necessary
to review certain of its preliminary findings.8 4 Appellee's apartment was
situated in a heavily traveled commercial locale 5 in which the crime rate
had risen considerably. Moreover, the appellee was held to have both
actual and constructive notice of previous criminal activity being committed within his hallways with such frequency that crime was felt to
86
be a predictable occurrence rather than merely a foreseeable event.
Having charged appellee with notice, the Kline court first approached
the problem by displacing precedent and relying instead on considerations
of logic and justice. After examining the circumstances the court concluded that neither the tenants nor the police could adequately provide
the measures necessary to prevent a recurrence of this type of crime.
Thus, by a process of elimination, the court concluded that the landlord
was the only party capable of remedying the problem and should therefore be burdened with the duty to do so. Under closer scrutiny, however,
it becomes evident that this line of reasoning is not helpful in answering
the primary question of whether a duty should actually exist, but rather
is supportive only to the extent that if a duty does exist, the landlord is
the logical party to bear it. Since this rationale does not provide a legal
basis for establishing that a duty exists, the court quite properly sought
alternative support for its holding through reference to traditional legal
principles."
On first view, the implied contract rationale, which provides that
the landlord has impliedly promised to maintain a specified level of
34. In addition to the specific findings made here, it is significant to note that
the District of Columbia courts have adopted a particularly liberal stance in the
landlord-tenant area, having made significant progress in equalizing the status of the
parties by departing from strict notions of property law. As illustrative of this trend,
see: Kendall v. Gore, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (landlord liable for crime committed by his unscreened employee); Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282
F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (violations of District of Columbia Housing Regulations
held to create landlord's duty in tort of providing structurally safe premisep prior to
rental) ; followed in Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Brown v.
Southball Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) (lease void if, at outset,
premises do not conform to standards of District of Columbia Housing Regulations) ;
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (landlord not permitted to evict
tenants in retaliation for tenants' reports of Housing Code violations); Tenants
Council of Tiber Island v. De Franceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1969) (limiting
the permitted effects of exculpatory clauses in the lease); Javins v. First National
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (warranty of habitability, measured
by standards of the Housing Regulations, implied in the lease agreement). See also
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal For Change, 54 GEo. L.J.
519 (1966).
35. Indeed, appellant testified that an increasing number of commercial offices
were supplanting apartment residences in the building -......
F.2d at ----n.24. This
fact makes it more likely that the flow of non-residents entering the building had
also increased.
36. ____F.2d at ------37. This court has exhibited a noticeable trend away from traditional principles
when the results of their use would contradict modern notions of fairness. See note 35
supra. As a related example of how this court has displaced antiquated principles of
law regarding a landowner's duties with a more realistic approach, see Daisy v.
Colonial Parking, Inc., 331 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1963), where Chief Judge Bazelon
chose to apply a general standard of negligence rather than the invitee-licensee
standard in a case involving a "trespasser."
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services throughout the leasehold period, appears convincing and adds
credence to the court's reasoning. Certainly this position is consistent
with this court's recent thinking vis-it-vis the nature of a lease agreement88
and in following this approach, the Kline court merely expands the scope
of the "package of goods and services" 3 9 to be provided by the landlord
so as to include reasonable security measures. Indeed, if the premise of
"implied contract" theory is sound, it would have been clearly inconsistent
for the court to exclude the maintenance of any service which was originally provided. However, the limitations of a strict application of this
rationale become immediately apparent when the facts in the instant case
are considered. Appellant's initial lease had expired at the time suit was
brought and the tenancy had been continued on a month-to-month basis.
Thus, it could be argued that the standard of care required under the
"implied contract" is that degree of protection offered and accepted at
the beginning of each monthly term. Therefore, carrying this argument
to its logical conclusion, unless appellee had failed to provide the agreed
level of protection within the month of the assault upon the appellant,
40
there could be no breach of duty.
In carefully examining this theory as it would be applied generally,
it becomes apparent that the requirement under contract principles that
the initial level of protection be continued might not parallel the needs
of the parties in many situations. For example, an indigent tenant would
presumably continue to receive the same minimal security he experienced
at the outset of his lease while the landlord to the opulent would be
required to continue providing extensive security measures regardless of
the possibility that such services would become unnecessary because of
a decrease in crime. Thus, while the implied contract theory is significant
in justifying the court's decision, it is supportive only to the extent of
justifying some duty being placed upon the landlord.
After determining that the landlord should bear some responsibility
in providing security services to his tenant, the court ultimately relied on
tort principles, not only to further support the imposition of a duty, but
also to provide an applicable standard of care. To these ends, the Kline
41
court analogized to the standard of care required by certain relationships,
38. See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
In Javins, however, the implied warranty of habitability was imposed on the rationale
that the District of Columbia Housing Regulations established minimum standards of
habitability which the landlord was required to provide throughout the term of the
lease. The section of the housing regulations which the Javins court focused upon
reads in relevant part:
[The] purpose [of this part of the Regulations] is to include repairs and maintenance designed to make a premises or neighborhood healthy and safe.
Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia § 2501 (1955), cited in Javins v.
First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (emphasis added).

The court in Kline, however, places no reliance upon the Housing Regulations.
39. 428 F.2d at 1074.

40. Judge MacKinnon, dissenting, argued that requiring appellee to provide

security was a mistake "when the tenant knew for years that such protection was not
being afforded." _...
F.2d at __ (emphasis added).
41. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
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notably innkeeper-guest. Although the analogy between innkeeper-guest
and landlord-tenant is certainly more than a novel insight, 42 reliance solely
on this similarity would have been ill-founded due to certain controlling
factual distinctions. 43 However, when considered in conjunction with the
previously accepted duties of the "exclusive control" theory, the court's
application of this analogy as a vehicle for the further imposition of liability upon the landlord serves the additional purpose of providing a more
acceptable basis upon which to determine the standard of care that will
control his conduct - i.e., "reasonable care in all the circumstances. '44
If the reasonableness standard is to be accepted as controlling, an
analysis of what the court required of appellee in this case brings to light
areas of inconsistency. By requiring the landlord to provide "the same
relative degree of security" 45 that he was employing when the appellant
became his tenant, it appears that the court is using the implied contract
rationale, which suggests maintenance of an agreed level of protection
throughout a specified term. Yet the strong implication remains that the
standard of care utilized in the instant case is based in tort, especially
since evidence of custom - the level of protection offered in similarly
situated buildings - was considered significant in determining the applicable standard. However, the court finds no inconsistency in requiring
appellee to maintain the original level of protection since it regards the
landlord's standard of care to be the same, whether his obligation is
grounded in tort or implied contract. 46 Such a rationale does justice to
neither theory since, on the one hand, it arbitrarily equates the initial
level of protection with "reasonableness," while in the alternative it fails
to adequately consider such factors as custom and prudence which are
relevant to determining the applicable tort standard. Indeed, under tort
rationale it would seem that since the court had noted the significant
increase in the crime rate in the vicinity, it might have required a corresponding increase in the degree of protection required. While it is
possible that the application of tort standards would indicate that the
level of services originally provided by the landlord in the instant case
might be considered to be "reasonable" protection; the ambiguity generated
42. Citing Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970),

the court stated:

Even the old common law courts responded with a different rule for a landlordtenant relationship which did not conform to the model of the usual agrarian lease.
Much more substantial obligations were placed upon the keepers of the inns (the
only multiple-dwelling houses known to the common law).
----F.2d at .
43. Innkeepers, excluding proprietors not offering lodging, typically engage in
short-term furnished housing at a relatively high premium. Moreover, a patron of
an innkeeper is traditionally held to have a license for use of the premises, which,
even in the District of Columbia, has fewer ties to the lease concept of conveyance of
an interest in property. See TIFFANY note 12 supra, at §§ 79, 829. Perhaps the closer
relationship between a hotel agreement and a short-term furnished premises lease
led to the earliest example of a court's imposition of a warranty of habitability in a
lease. See Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).

44....... F.2d at .......
45. Id. at
46. Id. at..
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by the recognition of both implied contract and tort standards suggests
that future decisions could more logically resolve this inconsistency by
abandoning the implied contract standard of care since, as previously noted,
the requirement that original services be maintained does not seem to
fully serve either party's interest.
Thus it seems clear that the tort standard of reasonableness, being a
more flexible rule, is better suited to handle the diversified situations that
may arise. 47 Yet, as might be expected, a standard of reasonableness is
not without its difficulties. 48 While the standard has been attacked as
being too vague in application, 49 a far more crucial shortcoming seems
to be inherent in the number of considerations embodied in the standard.
For example, when both the risk of criminal activity and the custom
found in similar apartment complexes are considered separately, two distinct obligations may arise which may well be in direct contradiction to
one another. In blighted urban neighborhoods the crime rate is typically
very high while the custom of providing any meaningful security services
is virtually non-existent. Thus, by applying the "criminal activity" criterion the landlord is duty-bound to provide extensive services, possibly
resulting in substantial rent increases 0 while under the "custom" test
the tenant realizes no additional security since the landlord has met the
standard by merely referring to similarly maintained buildings in the
neighborhood. This dichotomy illustrates the potential uncertainty of the
result when the standard is applied by a jury instructed to consider
both criteria.
Although the Kline court concludes that the landlord should be
obligated to provide adequate security measures for his tenant, it also
finds that the landlord would be "entirely justified in passing on the cost
of the increased protective measures to his tenants." 5'
As a general
proposition, this conclusion appears to be quite sound. However, upon
closer examination some undesirable effects may be seen as likely to
emerge. As noted previously, the cost of services in low-rental apartments may place an unfair burden upon the tenant. Additionally, if the
court finds that such services are required as a matter of right, based on
the "bargained-for-exchange" rationale, the landlord who is bound to long
term leases may find himself amidst a serious profit squeeze. In the alternative, a tenant may find that he receives fewer of the non-essential, yet
47. However, although the court discusses the possibility of a bona-fide patron
in the commercial portions of the building "lingering" in the halls, ( ......
F.2d at -----n.24), no consideration is given to the possibility that the intruder is a resident of
the building. Certainly this is an added difficulty, especially in a large housing
complex. Additionally, the scope of security service required would ordinarily be
limited to entrance controls which would have no effect on resident criminals.
48. As with negligence law generally, the numerous fact situations placed before
a finder of fact undoubtedly lead to trying questions of proximate causation, foreseeability and proper damages to be awarded. Moreover, concern for improperly
decided questions becomes amplified in cases where attractive plaintiffs sue impersonal
target defendants such as housing authorities or private apartment corporations.

49. See Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 591, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (1962).
50. See discussion at 784 supra.
51 .....F.2d at.
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amenable services previously provided by the landlord since funds must
be shifted to cover the expense of the required protective services. Finally,
5 2
as an ancillary consideration, the landlord of a rent-controlled building
will most likely lose anticipated profits, perhaps even to the extent that
he will be forced to abandon his building.53
The inherent difficulties involved in cost-distribution underscore justification for some legislative response. For example, if housing code legislation is ultimately interpreted by the courts to impose a duty on landlords
to provide reasonable security measures, the legislature may be able to
accomplish three desirable objectives. First, in recognizing that crime
prevention is one common interest, the legislature could standardize
minimum security requirements and possibly render economic aid in
their installation and maintenance. Secondly, such action would alleviate
financial pressures on the landlord and sustain the housing industry as a
viable area of private enterprise. Finally, by establishing minimum security
requirements and thus narrowing the scope of what constitutes "reasonable" precautions, the burden upon the courts and juries in determining
the appropriate standards for landlord conduct would become more manageable and effective.
In the final analysis, the Kline court has balanced the immediate
problem of crime in the landlord-controlled areas against the various
ramifications of placing a duty upon the landlord to provide reasonable
security measures to prevent such crime. The pivotal factor in the court's
decision to impose this duty seems to lie in the treatment of the lease as
an ordinary contract, for, in this light, the court may successfully circumvent the strong argument of vagueness implicit in the tort-based
standard. Thus, since many other jurisdictions cling to tort and property
concepts in dealing with the problem, the instant decision may affect only
those courts willing to extend considerably the "exclusive control" theory
as it pertains to tort. Moreover, the belief that this decision will open a
Pandora's box both in terms of difficulties in application of the standard
as well as harsh treatment of the landlord may regrettably further limit
its impact.
Juhan Runne
Rent control existed in the District of Columbia, albeit due to the economic
created by World War II. See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 45-1601 to
(1968). The Act, which expired on July 31, 1953, established rent ceilings
1941 and 1953. In New York City, rent control is still in effect. See 5 N.Y.
CITY CHARTER & ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ Y 51-1.0 et seq. (1969), which covers
buildings constructed prior to 1947. See also 5 N.Y. CITY CHARTER & ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § YY 51-1.0 (1969).
53. This is not to say that rent control alone can lead to abandonment. Insufficient rental income in non-controlled jurisdictions also frequently leads to this result.
Additionally, "If municipal code enforcement pressures are exerted on them, many
such owners will vacate and board up their buildings. . . . Thus, in cities where
low-rent housing always is in short supply, the phenomenon of pockets of abandoned
structures is becoming commonplace." F. KRISTOFF, URBAN HOUSING NEEDS THROUGH
THE 1980's: AN ANALYSIS AND PROJECTION 48-49 (1968) (Research Report No. 10
Prepared for the Consideration of the National Commission on Urban Problems).
52.
inflation
45-1611
between
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